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ABSTRACT 
Evolutionary computation (EC) can create a vast number of strategies for play­
ing simple games in a short time. Analysis of these strategies is typically more time-
consuming than their production. As a result, analysis of strategies produced by an 
EC system is often lacking or restricted to the extraction of superficial summary statis­
tics. This thesis presents a technique for extracting a functional signature from evolved 
agents that play games. This signature can be used as a visualization of agent behavior 
in games with two moves and also provides a numerical target for clustering and other 
forms of automatic analysis. The fingerprint can be used to induce a similarity measure 
on the space of game strategies. This thesis develops fingerprints in the context of the 
iterated prisoner's dilemma; we note that they can be computed for any two player 
simultaneous game with a finite set of moves. 
When using a clustering algorithm, the results are strongly influenced by the choice 
of the measure used to find the distance between or to compare the similarity of the 
data being clustered. The Euclidean metric, for example, rates a convex polytope as the 
most compact type of object and builds clusters that are contained in compact polytopes. 
Presented here is a general method, called multi-clustering, that compensates for the 
intrinsic shape of a metric or similarity measure. The method is tested on synthetic 
data sets that are natural for the Euclidean metric and on data sets designed to defeat 
k-means clustering with the Euclidean metric. Multi-clustering successfully discovers 
the designed cluster structure of all the synthetic data sets used with a minimum of 
parameter tuning. We then use multi-clustering and filtration on fingerprint data. 
vii 
Cellular representation is the practice of evolving a set of instructions for constructing 
a desired structure. This thesis presents a cellular encoding for finite state machines and 
specializes it to play the iterated prisoner's dilemma. The impact on the character and 
behavior of finite state agents of using the cellular representation is investigated. For the 
cellular representation presented a statistically significant drop in the level of cooperation 
is found. Other differences in the character of the automaton generated with a direct 
and cellular representation are reported. 
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1 Introduction 
Game theory is a tool with broad application to modelling in biology [19, 6], eco­
nomics [12], or even social behavior [13]. This thesis presents a mathematical construct, 
the fingerprint, which permits the creation of tools to automate routine parts of the 
analysis of game playing agents. All situations in which at least one agent can only 
act to maximize his utility through anticipating the responses to his actions by one or 
more other agents can be modelled as a simultaneous game. Agents involved in games 
are referred to as players. In game theory we assume that players are rational. That 
is, a player can (i) assess outcomes; (ii) calculate paths to outcomes; and (iii) choose 
actions that yield their most-preferred outcomes, given the actions of the other players. 
This rationality might in some cases be internally computed by the agent. In other 
cases, it might simply be embodied in behavioral dispositions built by natural, cultural 
or economic selection. In this thesis rationality is imposed via artificial selection. 
Each player in a game faces a choice among two or more possible strategies. A 
strategy is a predetermined program of play that tells him or her what actions to take 
in response to every possible strategy other players might use. 
An N-player game specifies that a player is engaged at a certain moment in a contest 
with TV — 1 other players. Examples of such games are Rock-Paper-Scissors, Prisoner's 
dilemma and Chess, which are two-player games. The public investment game is a 
game with more than two players. In a typical setup in experimental economics, an 
experimenter endows, say, six players with $10 each. The players are then offered to 
invest their money into a common pool knowing that the experimenter will triple the 
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amount in the pool and distribute it equally among all participants irrespective of their 
contributions. If all players cooperate and contribute their 10 dollars, they will end up 
with 30 dollars each. However, each player faces the temptation to defect and to free-ride 
on the other player's contributions since each invested dollar yields only a return of 50 
cents to the investor. Therefore the 'rational' and dominating solution is to defect and 
invest nothing. Consequentially, groups of rational players will forego the public good 
and are thus unable to increase their initial endowment. This leads to a deadlock in a 
state of mutual defection and economic stalemate. 
In a game, players' strategic concerns extend no further than their pairwise inter­
action. However, more games are often made with future moves in mind, and this can 
significantly alter the outcome and hence choice of strategies. Our focus in this thesis 
is iterated (or repeated) games, that is, games in which sets of players expect to face 
each other in similar situations on multiple occasions. I approach these Erst through 
the limited context of iterated prisoner's dilemmas and generalize to every iterated two 
player game. 
The Prisoner's Dilemma [4, 3] was first formalized by Tucker(1950), and it is classic 
model of cooperation and conflict in game theory. Two players each decide, without 
communication, whether to cooperate(C) or defect(D). The original Prisoner's Dilemma 
was a dilemma experienced by two accomplices, accused of a burglary. The local minions 
of the law are sure of the guilt of the two suspects they have in custody, but have only 
sufficient evidence to convict them of criminal trespass, a much less serious crime than 
burglary. In an attempt to get better evidence, the minions of the law separate the 
accomplices and make the same offer to both. The state will drop the criminal trespass 
charges and give immunity from any self-incriminating statements made, if the suspect 
will implicate his accomplice. There are 4 possible outcomes to this situation. 
1. Both suspects remain mum, serve their short sentence for criminal trespass, and 
divide the loot. 
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2,3. One suspect testifies against the other, going off scot-free and keeping all the 
loot for himself. The other serves a long sentence as an unrepentant burglar. 
4. Both suspects offer to testify against the other and receive moderate sentences 
because they are repentant and cooperative burglars. Each also keeps some chance at 
getting the loot. 
2 3 
D C D c 
P D 1 0 ? D P g 
C 5 3 C r A 
(1) (2) 
Figure 1.1 (1)A payoff matrix of prisoner's dilemma - scores are earned by 
strategy ^ based on its actions and those of its opponent (2) 
A payoff matrix of the general two player game - f, 5", T, and 
A are scores given for the game 
In order to analyze the Prisoner's Dilemma, it is convenient to arithmetize these 
outcomes as numerical payoffs. We characterize the action of maintaining silence as 
cooperation and the action of testifying against one's accomplice as defection. The 
players receive individual payoffs depending on the actions taken. The payoffs used in 
this thesis are shown in Figure 1.1. The game Prisoner's Dilemma requires that the 
payoffs satisfy the following inequalities: 
PD1) T > A > P > & 
PD2) 2E>T + 6". 
For each possible pair of moves, the payoffs to strategy «S against its opponent are 
listed in the appropriate cell in Figure 1.1. A is the "reward" payoff that each player 
receives if both cooperate, f is the "punishment" that each receives if both defect. T 
is the "temptation" that each receives if he alone defects and is the "sucker" payoff 
that he receives if he alone cooperates. We assume here that the game is symmetric, i.e., 
that the reward, punishment, temptation or sucker payoff is the same for each player. 
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It is now easy to see that we have the structure of a dilemma like the one in the story. 
Numerically the dilemma is as following. Suppose the opponent cooperates. Then 
«S gets R for cooperating and T for defecting, and so is better off defecting. Suppose 
the opponent defects. Then «5 gets S for cooperating and P for defecting, and so 
is again better off defecting. The move D for ^ is said to strictly dominate the move 
C: whatever his opponent does, he is better off choosing D than C. By symmetry D 
also strictly dominates C for the column strategy Thus two "rational" players will 
defect and receive a payoff of P, while two "irrational" players can cooperate and receive 
greater payoff R. If the game is played indefinitely, the correct behavior becomes less 
clear. If the outcome of earlier trials can affect the decision making policy of players 
in subsequent trials, learning can take place and both players may seek to cooperate 
because of the second inequality 
2#>T + & 
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma(IPD) is widely used to demonstrate emergent cooperative 
behaviors in populations of selfishly acting players [7, 8, 14, 5] and is span most of social 
science including sociology [13], psychology [18], and economics [12] as well as biology [19, 
6]. Biological applications include: Myrmecophily (the interaction of lycaenid butterfly 
larvae with ants); Predator inspection fish; Egg-trading in simultaneous hermaphrodites; 
and Blood-sharing in vampire bats. Important economic applications include: collusion 
between firms, trade barriers between countries, and public goods problems. 
Axelrod(1984) described the results of two computer-based tournaments involving 
the prisoner's dilemma. Strategies were submitted by researchers and practitioners in 
a wide range of helds(e.g., economics, mathematics, political science) and placed in a 
round-robin competition to determine a "best" policy. The original tournament had 14 
entries, along with a random strategy. Although many intricate, sophisticated strategies 
were entered, the highest average score was obtained by the simplest strategy: Tit-for-
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Generate a population of structures 
Repeat 
Test the structures for quality 
Select structures to reproduce 
Produce new variations of selected structures 
Replace old structures with new ones 
Until Satisfied 
Figure 1.2 General evolutionary algorithm 
Tat, submitted by Anatol Rapoport. This strategy is defined as cooperating on the first 
move and then matching whatever the other player did on the preceding move. The 
second tournament had 62 entries and once again Tit-for-Tat was winner. 
It was noted that eight of the 62 entries can be used to account for how well a given 
strategies did with the entire set. Axelrod used these eight strategy as opponents for a 
simulated evolving population of strategies. He used a type of evolutionary algorithm 
and noted that many of the strategies actually resembled Tit-for-Tat. The recent re­
search into the IPD has imposed an evolutionary dynamic on a population of players 
[14]. 
Evolutionary algorithm mimics the process of natural evolution, the driving process 
for the emergence of complex and well-adapted organic structures. To put it succinctly 
and simply, evolution is the result of the interplay between evaluation and selection. A 
single individual of a population is affected by other individuals of a population as well 
as by its environment. The better an individual performs under these conditions the 
greater is the chance for the individual to live for longer time and generate additional 
offspring, which in turn inherit the parental genetic information. Over the course of 
evolution, this leads to penetration of the population with the genetic information of 
individuals of above-average fitness. The nondeterministic nature of reproduction leads 
to a permanent production of novel genetic information and therefore to the creation 
of differing offspring This neo-Darwinian model of organic evolution is mimicked by the 
structure of the general evolutionary algorithm in Figure 1. 
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Generate an initial population of players 
Repeat 
Evaluate players with a PD tournament 
Pick higher scoring solution to reproduce 
Use variation operators such as crossover, mutation to make new players 
from copies of the successful players. 
Place new players in the population 
Until the players are acceptable 
Figure 1.3 the specialization of a standard type of evolutionary algorithm 
to evolving competitive agents for the IPD. 
Evolution produces new forms over time. How does evolution produce new forms? 
There are two opposing forces that drive evolution: variation and selection. Variation 
is the process that produces new alleles and, more slowly, genes. Variation can also 
change which genes are or are not expressed in a given individual. Selection is the 
process whereby some alleles survive and others do not. Variation builds up genetic 
diversity; selection reduces it. Evolutionary computation operates on populations of 
data structures. It accomplishes variation by making random changes in these data 
structures and by blending parts of different structures. These two processes are called 
mutation and crossover, and together are referred to as variation operators. Selection 
is accomplished with any algorithm that favors data structures with a higher fitness 
score. There are many different possible selection methods. To impose an evolutionary 
dynamic on a population of IPD players, each player's strategy has to be represented 
by a data structure. One example of such a structure is a finite state machine. A finite 
state machine is a finite collection of states and possible inputs, where each state and 
input value has a transition to another state and an output associated with it. For 
example, the strategy Two- 7b(s which is an implementation of the defects only 
if its opponent has defected on the last two actions is specified by a finite state machine 
as Figure 1.4. 
The finite state machine from Figure 1.4 can be into an array of integers in the struc­
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Tit-For-Two-Tats Tit-For-Two-Tats 
Initial response: C 0 
Initial state :1 1 
State If D If C 
1 C-»2 C-»l  0-^2  0 —» 1 






Figure 1.4 Table representation annotated and unannotated and digraph 
representation of the finite state machine for Tit-For-Two-Tats. 
tural manner. First we strip a finite state machine down to the integers that describe 
it (setting C = 0, D = 1) like in Figure 1.4. To find the structural grouping gene we 
simply read the stripped table from left to right, assembling the the integers into the 
array: 0102011201. There are many other data structure representations such as neural 
nets, look up tables, and IS Ac-list [1]. They are explained briefly in Chapter 2 and 
our focus is only on finite state machines. The structures are evolved by implementing 
the evolutionary algorithm. The advantage of this methodology is that the very com­
plex problem of strategy in the iterated prisoner's dilemma can be attacked empirically 
through computational experiments. Because the iterated prisoner's dilemma is a mem­
ber of a much broader class of games, procedures used with this game may be easily 
generalized to other games. 
There is an acute problem with understanding the output of these evolutionary com­
putation studies that generate game playing strategies. The software strategies that can 
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be produced in an afternoon can require weeks or months of analysis to classify and 
understand. In this thesis we give a technique for /mperyrmfm# a software strategy that 
plays a game. The fingerprint is a function that records the behavior of a game playing 
agent against a continuum of opponents that are random variations of a fixed strategy. 
This fixed strategy can be changed to obtain different types of fingerprints. 
The fingerprinting technique is demonstrated here for the iterated prisoner's dilemma 
but generalizes smoothly to other two player games. The fingerprint for an agent playing 
a game with 71 moves is a map /x : R" —» R, where .4 is a fixed strategy for playing the 
game, the independent variables are stochastic parameters controlling a type of noise, 
and the function's value is an expected score for play of the agent being fingerprinted 
against X, given the type of noise specified by the independent variables. A more 
rigorous definition appears in Chapter 2. When the game playing agents are implemented 
as finite state machines, a closed functional form can be computed for fingerprints. 
An approximate fingerprint can be computed for any type of game playing agent by 
simulation. 
Fingerprints found by computing the expected score of an agent against an entire pa­
rameterized space of other strategies captures substantial information about a strategy. 
Summarizing the agent in functional form permits us to use the graph of the fingerprint 
function as a visualization tool, as we will see in Chapter 2. There are a number of 
ways to impose a metric (distance function) on function spaces. Any of these permit 
the creation of a distance measure between strategies by computing the metric on the 
strategies's fingerprints. Varying the strategy, .4, used to compute the fingerprinting 
function permits the creation of many different types of fingerprints with corresponding 
visualization and similarity measures. Using these distance measures, we can try cluster­
ing evolved strategies to analyze them. Clustering is a type of exploratory multivariate 
statistical analysis also called as cluster analysis, unsupervised classification analysis, or 
even numerical taxonomy. In molecular biology, clustering is used to group biological 
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samples or genes into separate clusters based on their statistical behavior. The main 
objective of clustering is to End similarities between experiments or genes (given their 
expression ratios across all genes or samples, respectively), and then group similar sam­
ples or genes together to assist in understanding relationships that might exist among 
them. 
Cluster analysis is based on a mathematical formulation of a measure of similarity. 
There are a number of characteristics that distinguish different approaches to cluster 
analysis. A cluster which is very roughly spherical or elliptical is referred to as globular. 
An standard algorithm is k-means cluster given in the algorithm 3.1.1 in Chapter 3. 
K-means clustering generates a specific number of disjoint clusters. It is well suited to 
generating globular clusters. A more precise mathematical term is convex, which means 
that any line you can draw between two cluster members stays inside the boundaries of 
the cluster. In contrast 'non-globular clusters' may have a very complicated, convoluted 
boundary. Members of globular clusters typically bear some resemblance to the mean 
of the cluster. The mean of a non-globular cluster is often irrelevant, and can even 
lie outside the cluster. Often data dose not fall naturally into globular clusters. We 
introduce "multi-clustering" in Chapter 3 to compensate for the intrinsic shape of a 
metric or similarity measure and apply it to fingerprinting data sets of evolved game 
populations. 
In Chapter 4, we introduce a cellular representation for finite state machines of 
game strategies. Cellular encoding [?, 10] is a technique for representing an object as 
a set of directions for constructing it, rather than as a direct specification. The name 
ce/Mor encodm# comes from an analogy between the developmental rules governing 
construction of the desired objects and the biology governing construction of complex 
tissues from cells. A helpful way to think of the cellular encoding process is as a form of 
developmental biology for structures. Suppose we have a complex object: a molecule, 
a finite state machine, a neural net, or a parse tree. A series of rules or productions 
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that transform a starting object into an object ready to have its fitness evaluated can be 
used as a linear gene in an evolutionary algorithm. Instead of having complex variation 
operators (which must deal with the full complexity of the object) we can use standard 
variation operators for linear genes. The behavior of those operators in the search space 
is often difficult to understand, but this is also often true of operators used with direct 
encodings. The idea of evolving a set of directions for constructing an object is an 
excellent one with vast scope. In Chapter 4, we create a cellular encoding for finite state 
machine and compare it with the direct encodings used in Chapter 2. 
In Chapter 5, using functional fingerprints, we cluster agents and rapidly identify 
common agent types in spite of the representational obfuscation often generated by 
evolutionary training techniques. We introduce the idea of with which we first 
use to remove the well known and then later common strategies. Multiclustering which 
is introduced in Chapter 3 is then used to cluster the remaining strategies. Together, 
filtration and multiclustering make analysis of evolved agents substantially easier. 
11 
2 Fingerprints 
A two player game specifies that a player is engaged at a certain moment in a 
contest with one other player. In a simultaneous game, each player makes a choice 
without communication, and then their plays are revealed. Rock-Paper-Scissors is an 
example of a two player simultaneous game. Chess is a two player game but not a 
simultaneous game. In this thesis we consider only two player simultaneous games . A 
two player game with n moves is a two player game that each player hag m choices. For 
example, Rock-Paper-Scissors is a two player game with three moves and the prisoner's 
dilemma is a two player game with two moves. Evolutionary computation is used to 
train game playing agents to exhibit the behavior(s) required by the simulation. This 
means that if we don't have a fairly high level of understanding and control of the 
behavior of evolving game playing agents, we have a real problem with believing social 
simulations based on evolved game playing agents. Evolutionary algorithms can generate 
about 200,000 generations of evolution per hour on a 36 member population of prisoner's 
dilemma playing agents with a standard desktop computer, If we save a population for 
analysis 50 generations then we get 4000 groups of 30 agents per hour. This is a rate 
of data acquisition similar to the combined output of all the genome projects currently 
running. If we use only finite state machines then we have a problem of figuring out 
what they are doing and comparing them. If we try to compare between representations 
(other methods of coding prisoner's dilemma players) then we must have something like 
a semantic understanding of what the finite state machine is doing. To address these 
problems, we introduce fingerprinting of game strategies. 
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We focus on iterated two player games with two moves in Section 2.1. and generalize 
to all iterated two player games with M moves in Section 2.2. 
2.1 The fingerprints for an iterated two player games with two 
moves 
Prisoner's diZemmo, explained in detail in the introduction is one example of a si­
multaneous game between twd players with two possible moves. Each player makes a 
choice of whether to cooperate or defect, and then their plays are revealed. 
There are a huge number of available strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma. 
Many of these strategies can be represented with finite state machines. The example 
strategies described in Table 2.1 are represented as finite state machines in Figure 2.1. 
AUG The AUG strategy always plays C. 
A11D The A11D strategy always plays D. 
Pavlov The strategy, Pavlov, plays C as its initial action and cooper­
ates thereafter if its action and its opponent's actions matched 
last time. 
Tit-fbr-Tat The strategy, Tit-for-Tat, plays C as its initial action and 
then repeats the other player's last action. 
Psycho The strategy, Psycho, chooses D as its initial action and then 
plays the opposite of its opponent's last action. 
Tit-For-Two-Tats The strategy, Tit-For-Two-Tats, chooses C as its initial action 
and then defects only if its opponent has defected on the last 
two actions. 
Two-Tits-Foi^Tat The strategy, Two-Tits-For-Tat, chooses C as its initial action 
and then defects twice if its opponent has defected on the last 
actions. 
The Random strategy simply Hips a fair coin to decide how 
to play. 
Table 2.1 Examples of strategies for the iterated two player game with two 
possible moves 
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AUG A11D Tit-for-Tat 
Initial response:C Initial response:C Initial response: C 
Initial state :1 Initial state :1 Initial state :1 
State ED EC State ED IfC State ED IfC 
1 C-+ 1  C ^ l  1 D-» 1  D -» 1 1 D-»  1  C-^  1  
Tit-Fbr-Two-Tats Two-Tits-For-Tat 
Psycho Initial response:C Initial response: C 
Initial response:C Initial state :1 Initial state :1 
Initial state :1 State ED IfC State ED IfC 
State If D I fC 1 C-+2 C-+1 1 D-^2 C^ 1 
1 C —* 1 D-» 1  2 D-+2 C-+ 1  2 D -4 2 D —> 1 
Pavlov RipoS 
Initial response:C Initial response: C 
Initial state :1 Initial state :1 
State ED IfC State ED EC 
1 D-»2 C-+1 1 C-+3 C-^2 
2 C-^ 1  D-^2 2 D-» 1  C-+3 
3 C-+3 D-»3 
Figure 2.1 Finite state machines of some strategies for the iterated two 
player game with two possible moves D and C 
2.1.1 Definition of fingerprints 
The play of two finite state machines in the presence of noise can be represented 
as a Mortoo pnocesa. This allows for the determination of an expected score for any 
pair of strategies by standard techniques in stochastic processes [17]. We will use game 
playing agents with strategies that incorporate parameterized noise to fingerprint other 
agents. The fingerprints will have independent variables that establish the character of 
the noise and return a dependent variable that is the expected score of the agent being 
fingerprinted against the noisy player. For the iterated prisoner's dilemma, we will have 
noise that represents probabilities of cooperating and defecting. The fingerprint will 
thus be a map from probabilities (z, y) of cooperating and defecting, respectively, to a 
value, the expected score against the noisy agent. 
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Definition 2.1.1. 7/ .4 is o atmtegy /or pZaying a (wo pZayer game wit/i two poaai6Ze 
Tnovea, (/ten Jv4(^4, z, y) is a atnzte^/ w/itcA Aaa a pno6oM% z o/ cAooaing tAe mo«e C, 
a pro6o6*Z% %/ o/ cAooaing tAe move D, and of/ierwise uaea t/^e response appropriate to 
t&e atrate^y ^4. fbr t/ie atrategy apace 5" of (wo pZayer game w*tA two mouea, we Aave 
tAe junction : 5" x F i-> 5" wAere F = {(z, %/)|z, {/E^R, 0<z + y<l} tAat yieZda a 
continuum o/ atrotegiea. 
The notation Jv4 comes from the initials for Joss and Ann. Joss was a player who 
submitted to Axelrod's famous computer tournament for the iterated prisoner's dilemma. 
It would occasionally defect without provocation in hopes of a slight improvement in it's 
score. Ann is the first name of Dr. Ann Stanley who suggested the addition of random 
cooperation [20, 2] instead of random defection. When z + %/ = 1, the strategy .4 is not 
used and the resulting behavior is a random strategy with play probabilities (z, y). 
In more general terms, a JX strategy is an alteration of a strategy, /I, that causes 
the strategy to be played with random noise inserted into the responses. The strategy, 
.4, plays based on its opponent's past actions even when random actions are gener­
ated instead of using its own action. Nesting the Joss-Ann construction yields no new 
strategies. 
Lemma 2.1.2. 7%e atmtegy JA(JA(^4, z%, 2 /2), 2%, %) ia eçuivoZent to JA(.4, Z2 + (1 — 
%2 — %)zi, #2 + (1 — Z2 — #3)2/1). 
Proof The probability of randomly choosing C is z% plus the probability of using 
JA(X,Zi,;/i) times z%. Similarly, the probability of randomly choosing D is 2/3 plus 
the probability of using Jy4(v4, Zi,%/i) times %/i. O 
Définition 2.1.3. ^4 ^ngerprint F^(^,z,2/) wit/i 0 < z,%/ < 1, z + %/ < 1, onj atrategiea 
^ and .4, ia t/ie /unction tAot retuma tAe ezpected acore 0/ atrotegy ^ agoinat JA(^4, z, y) 
/or eocA poaaiAZe (z,2/). TTie doubZe ^ngerprint z, %/) wit/i 0 < z,2/ < 1 retuma 
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(he eapecfed acore of a(nz(eg%/ ^ agaznaf JA(^4., z, y) zf z + %/ < 1 and JA(B, 1 — y, 1 — z) 
zfz  +  z/  >  1 .  
While the Engerprint function itself is often possible to End, it is the graph or an 
approximation of the graph that is usually used in analysis. This is in part because a 
useful approximation of the graph of the function can be computed in cases where the 
analysis to End the actual function would be intractable. 
The concept of the double fingerprint was introduced to extend the Engerprint to the 
unit square in a natural fashion. A unit square is preferable because it is more easily 
manipulated by a computer, is more easily viewed by humans, and uses paper more 
efficiently. 
lb compute and understand fingerprints, Martou c/wzna [17] are required. Let 7 be 
a countable set where a random variable, %, has a value. Each % € 7 is called a state, 
and 7 is called the aWe apace. A matrix, T = ((% : z, j € 7), is atocAoafzc if every row 
(t*, : j E 7) is a distribution, i.e. Zjeft#=l. 
A Mortoz; c/wzm is formalized by a deEnition in terms of the corresponding stochastic 
matrix T. (%n)n>o is a Mor&ou c/mrn with znztzoZ dzatrz&ufzon A and tranaztzon TTiatrzz 
T if 
(i) %o bas distribution A. 
(ii) for n > 0, conditional on = i, %n+i has distribution (t# : j E 7) and is 
independent of %o,..., %^-i-
It is sometimes possible to break a Martor c/iam into smaller pieces, each of which 
is relatively easy to understand, and which together give an understanding of the whole. 
This is done by identifying the communicating classes of the chain. 
We say that z Zeada to j and write z —» j, if P((%n = j for some n > 0) > 0. 
We say z commumcatea toztA j and write z +-» if both z —> j and j ^ z and this 
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communicating relation is an equivalence relation on the state space. Thus, this relation 
breaks a Martow chain into smaller communicating classes. 
Moreover, a state i is recurrent, if Pi(X„ = i for infinitely many n) = 1. A state 
t is transient, if P*(%m = i for inGnitely many n) = 0. Thus, a recurrent state is one 
to which you keep coming back and a transient state is one which you eventually leave 
forever. Every state of a Markou c/min is either recurrent or transient. 
2.1.2 Computing an example of a fingerprint 
To find the Engerprint with 0 < z,%/ < 1 and z+%/ < 1, the first step is to construct a 
Martou c/wzin for the two strategies involved. In the case of Fra-/or-rs*(fo%foi;, z, %/), 
the set of ordered pairs {(Cl, Dl), (Cl, Cl), (D2, Dl), (D2, CI)} forms the state space. 
A letter denotes an action. The numbers in a pair denote the internal (finite state 
machine) states of strategies Poufou and Tit — For — Tot, respectively. It is not difficult 
to verify that the given combinations of internal states and actions cover all attainable 
possibilities. Then, constructing the transition matrix, P, for the Markov chain is just 
a matter of putting the transition probabilities between the states in matrix form. 
(D1,C1) (Cl, Cl) (D1,D2) (C1,D2) 
(D1,C1) 0 0 %/ 1-1/ 
(CI, CI) y 1-1/ 0 0 
(D1,D2) 1 — 3 z 0 0 
(C1,D2) 0 0 1 — z z 
Because this Markov chain consists of one finite communicating class, it has the 
stationary distribution 7r(again see [17]), and it can be found by solving the equations 
(f — /)7T = 0 and ?r(i) = 1. We obtain: 
2%/(l - z) + z(l - z) + 3/(1 - %/) ' 
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z(l — z) 
22/(1 - z) 4- z(l - z) 4- 3/(1 — %/) ' 
2/(1 - %) 
2y(l - z) 4- z(l - z) 4- %/(! - %/) ' 
2/(1 - 3/) \ 
22/(1 - z) 4- z(l - z) 4- 2/(1 - 2/) 
With 7T in hand, computing the expected score can be completed by taking a dot 
product of 7T with the appropriate score vector (5", P, P, T)' which gives corresponding 
scores for ((C1,D1), (Cl, Cl), (D2, D1),(D2, CI)). This yields the Rngerprint function 
where 0 < z, 2/ < 1 and z 4- y < 1. 
In the case of the iterated prisoner's dilemma, we usually score 5" = 0, P = 3, P = 
l,and T = 5; hence 
Pnt_for_Taf(fW(W, Z, #) = 
3z(z - 1) 4- 2/(z - 1) + 52/(2/ - 1) 
22/(z — 1) 4- z(z - 1) 4- 2/(2/ — 1) 
A shaded plot of this function appears in Figure 2.2. 
Theorem 2.1.4. A dowMe /mgerprmt, P^g(^, z, 2/), w continwowa at a poW if and onfy 
if tAe yZngeTprinta f^( ,^ z, 2/) and fg(«S, z, 2/) are continwoua. 
Proof => the proof is direct. 
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Figure 2.2 VI shaded plot of *._Ta*(Poi;fot;, z, y) for prisoner's 
dilemma. Lighter colors represent higher scores with black=0 
and white=5. Shading is modified to show three important 
parts of the score space. The high shaded band represents scores 
within a narrow range of the score for mutual cooperation. The 
middle shaded band similarly represents the score obtained by 
mutual random play. The low shaded band marks scores near 
the score for mutual defection. 
<= The two fingerprints intersect at the diagonal of the unit square, where z + %/ = 1. 
If z -f y = 1, then z, y) and 1 — y, 1 — z) are the same random strategy 
regardless of the choice of .4 and B. Therefore, ^ will always score the same along the 
diagonal no matter what strategy is used. Each fingerprint is continuous. Moreover, 
they agree at their intersection, so the double fingerprint is continuous. O 
Lemma 2.1.5. 7/  ^ond .4 ore rBpreaenWk ^nite mocAinea, and 
Mar tor; c/win on off poira o/ actions and sWea /or t/»eae atmtayieg w a comm%n:cat*n  ^
cfaag, then z, y) ia con(mwow over f = {(z, %/)|0 < z, %/ < 1,0 < z + y < 1}. 
f foq/i At each time step, the strategy ^ has only one possible state transition, as does 
X. Thus, the only indeterminate change in each state is the action by z, y). 
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Each row of the trangition matrix of its Mortou chain has two entries such that the 
strategy X responds appropriately in one entry and inappropriately in the other entry. 
Therefore, the transition probabilities in the Markcw chain are z and y or 1 — z and 
1 — p. Because the chain is a communicating class and its state space is Suite, it is 
recurrent. Thus it has the unique stationary distribution [17]. The vector representing 
the distribution will have entries that are rational functions in 1 — z, z, 1 — %/, and y, 
because it is determined by row multiplication on the transition matrix of the Mar&ou 
chain. The values of all possible score are finite, so there are no singularities over 
{(z,%/)|0 < z,y < 1,0 < z + y < 1}. Thus, z,%/) is continuous over O 
Notice that Z^mma 2.1.5 imphes that any recurrent and closed communicating class 
within a Markov chain constructed by finite states machines will yield a continuous 
fingerprints. 
Theorem 2.1.6. and .4 are atratayiea repreaentabk ^ni(e a(a(e machines, (hen 
z, y) ia confinwowa wer^. 
Let ^ be a collection of states which consists of all possible ordered pairs (A&t, ) 
where and t are the last response and the state of «S and and Z are the last re­
sponse and the state of J^4(X,z,y), respectively. We can construct a Martou chain 
over 5" with transition probabihties that are linear functions of the values of z and %/. 
The state space, of Afartou chaina may be decomposed as 5^ = T U QU,..., where 
T consists of transient states and Ci, C^,... are closed, disjoint, recurrent communicat­
ing classes [15]. By Z^mma 2.1.5 each communicating class within this Mar&ou chain 
will give a continuous fingerprint over f. The transient states leading to the recurrent 
communicating classes must also give probabilities that are products of 1 — z, z, 1 — y, 
and y for entering any of the recurrent communicating classes. If transient states leading 
to the recurrent communicating classes don't have a loop, the resulting fingerprint is a 
sum of polynomial multiples of continuous functions over .f. Otherwise, the probability 
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for entering any of the recurrent communicating classes is a power series. Therefore the 
resulting fingerprint is a sum of power series multiples of continuous functions over JF' 
and it is continuous because a fingerprint is bounded by the definition. O 
Corollary 2.1.7. ond X ore atrotepiea repreaentoWe ^nite atote mochinea, (hen 
iri/initeZy di^ertntioùfe over (he interior 0/ (he «mit açuore. 
Proo/ In the proof of Theorem 2.1.6 we saw that the fingerprint is the sum of continous 
functions. Each term is of the form 
where r is the power series and the polynomials p and g have no common factors. 
Furthermore, bounded power series and rational functions are known to be in C°° over 
their domain. Therefore, the fingerprint is in over O 
Definition 2.1.8. Strategy ia aoid to 6e the dwoZ 0/ atrotc^y i^w4 ond X' con 6e 
written oa /mite atote mochinea thot ore identical ezcept thot their reaponaea ore rereraed. 
The strategies Tit-For-Tat emd Psycho are examples of dual strategies. Tit-For-Tat 
repeats its opponent's last choice. Psycho plays the opposite of the opponent's last 
choice. A strategy can be its own dual. For example, the strategy Pavlov is a self-dual 
strategy, as shown in Figure 2.3. Given the same input string, it generates reversed 
responses if its initial action is reversed. Notice that the initial action does not impact 
the fingerprint at a strategy composed of a single communicating class 
Pavlov 
input CCDCDDDCDCD... 
Fir at action C reaponae CCCDDCDCCDD ... 
Fir at action D reaponae DDDCCDCDDCC... 
Figure 2.3 An example of a self-dual strategy 
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Theorem 2.1.9. 7/^4 ond ^4' one d«aZ a(ro(egiea, then f%4'(«S,z, y) w iden(icoZ (o the 
_/%nc(ion fx(«9, z, %/) extended over (he unit aguore. 
Fmq/. The Mar&ou chain for the dual strategy A will have the same transitions as the 
Mor&ov chain for the strategy A However, each entry for z corresponds to the prob-
abihty that the strategy J(^4, z, y) will randomly choose C when it would not normally 
do so. For strategy A, this will occur whenever J(.4', z, %/) does not randomly respond 
D, which has probability 1 — y. 
Likewise, each y corresponds to the probabihty that the strategy J(X, z, y) re­
sponds D when it would normally respond C. For strategy w4', this will occur whenever 
z, y) does not randomly respond C, which has probability 1 — z. 
Thus the Mar&ov chain for J(A, z, y) is the Martov chain for J(.4, z, %/) with the 
mapping (z,y) ^ (! — %/,! — z). Therefore, fLw(«S,z,y) extends to the remainder of 
the unit square the function given by z,y). O 
Corollary 2.1.10. and X' are d«of a(r%(egiea, (hen z, y) ia in^ni(eZy di/^ 
/eren(io6fe over (he in(erior o/ (he uni( agware. 
froq/i By Theorem 2.1.9, the function FAA'(«S,z, y) is an extension of the function 
z, y) to the unit square, and it is a continuous rational function with no singu­
larities on the interior of the unit square. Thus, («S, z, y) is infinitely differentiate 
over the interior of the unit square. O 
As we can see, the dual strategy can be used to create a natural extension of the 
fingerprint into a dual fingerprint over the unit square. From now on we call double 
fingerprints with Dual strategies as just fingerprints. 
Notice that a finite states machine can be decomposed into transient communicating 
classes and recurrent communicating classes. Because a finite states machine will have 
C and D as input with positive probabilities z and y, respectively when it plays with a 
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strategy Jv4(5", z,y), it will finally leave the transient classes and enter recurrent com­
municating classes (and never goes back to transient classes). For that reason, transient 
communicating classes don't contribute much to calculating asymptotic score but give 
only the probabilities for entering recurrent communicating classes when we calculate 
its fingerprint. 
Theorem 2.1.11. J/ a /mite state mac/tine has one recurrent communicating c/ass, 
then its /mgeryrint is just some as the fingerprint o/ its recurrent cfass no matter what 
transient states it has. 
Proof Since the finite state machine only have one recurrent class the probability that 
transient states make to to enter the recurrent communicating class is 1. So its fingerprint 
is the fingerprint of its communicating class. O 
Corollary 2.1.12. Zet P and 5" 6e /înite state TTtachines that have one recurrent com­
municating class. 7/ their recurrent communicating classes are isomorphic, then F and 
5" have same /ingerprints. 
Proof Since P and 5" have only one recurrent communicating classes, their fingerprints 
exactly same as fingerprints of their recurrent communicating class. Moreover, their 
recurrent communicating class are same so their fingerprints are also same. O 
2.1.3 Additional examples of fingerprints 
We give several more examples of fingerprints, computed in the same manner as the 
preceding example. Some of these fingerprints are displayed as shaded plots in Figure 
2.4. 
(AMD) = P(1 — z) + Ta; 
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Figure 2.4 Shaded plots of the fingerprint functions for the strategies AMD, 
XHC, Tit — For — Tot, Payc/io, Tit — For — Two — Tot, and 
Two — Tit* — For — Tot in reading order. The «harling in these 
plots matches that given in Figure 2.2. 
Inserting the usual numerical scores we obtain: 
fra-For-Ta*(AZfD) = 4z + 1 
fra-For-To* (AMC) = + A(1 — y) 
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Inserting the usual numerical scores we obtain: 
fra-for-r«d(AZZC) = 3(1-%/) 
Fn-F„-rM(Tit - For - Tat, x, y) - Pv' + + ^  
Inserting the usual numerical scores we obtain: 
fra-for-r^Tit-For-Tat, z, y) = 
Fra-for-Tof (faycho, z, y) 
P(1 - y)(l - T) + g(l - af + T(1 - y)% + ^(1 - y)(l - %)) 
(2(1 - z)(l - y) + (1 - z)^ + (1 - y)') 
Inserting the usual numerical scores we obtain: 
Fra-For-Taf (^^ For — Two — Tota, Z, y) 
_ 5"(zy^ + zy) + A(z(l - y)2 + af y + ry(l - y)) + Tzy^ + Fy^ 
z^y + 2zy^ + z + y^ 
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Inserting the usual numerical scores we obtain: 
-T*. _ T., 
or-ro* — Ti(a — For — Tat, z, y) 
= /rocAz^ + T(yz^ 4- zy) 4- f (y(l - z)^ 4- %/z + zy(l - z)) 4- ^zy^z^ + 2z^%/ 4- zy^ 4- y 
Inserting the usual numerical scores we obtain: 
fr#_Fm-Ta*(Two - T*(g - For - Tot, z, y) 3z^ 4- 5z^y 4- 4zy 4- z%^ 4- y 
z^ 4- 2z*y 4- 4-zy^ 4- y 
2.1.4 An example ûngerprint of a non-finite state machine 
Figure 2.5 Fingerprints fTa-For-r«a(Mojor#y, z, y), obtained by sam­
pling. 
An example of a strategy that cannot be implemented with a finite state machine 
is the Majority strategy, defined as follows; cooperate initially and cooperate thereafter 
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if a majority of your opponent's actions are not defection. A sampled representation of 
fra-ror-Ta(Ma;ority, z, y) is given in Figure 2.5. 
The strategy Majority's action depends on the majority of its opponent's actions. 
Each time Majority plays, it should consider which action have been chosen the most by 
its opponent. We see it cannot be encoded by a finite state machine. We can, however, 
construct a Markov chain with an infinite number of states which include all events that 
can happen when Majority plays with JA(T:t — For — Tat,z,y). Using this Markov 
chain, Fra-For-r«a (Majority, z,y) can be found. 
Let ^ = {(C, Q), (C, Dj), (D, Q), (D, D*)|i € Z} is the set of states of this Markov 
chain, where i denote how many times JA(Tit — For — Tat) has cooperated more than 
it has defected. 
sjpC+p) (DC 
1-9 r i-xî~i 
j=D+2) CCD+U (CD+O 
Figure 2.6 The Markov chain of Majority fingerprint when it plays with 
Tit-For-Tat. State labels are the actions of the two players in 
the order Majority, JA(Tit — For — Tat, z, y) together with the 
number of cooperations in excess of defections. Negative num­
bers indicate fewer cooperations than defections have happened. 
The probabilities between each state are not difficult to compute and are given in 
Figure 2.6. 
We consider several cases depending upon the variables z and y. These variables 
determine if the Markov chain goes to (D, D_œ) or (C, C<%,) and find f^the probability 
to go to (C, Coo) and to go to for each case. 
Case 1) 0 < z < 1/2 and 0 < y < 1/2, the chain goes to (D, D_oo) or (C, Coo). 
Case 2) 0 < z < 1/2 and 1/2 < y < 1, the chain goes to only (D, D_oo). 
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Case 3) 0 < y < 1/2 and 1/2 < z < 1, the chain goes to only (C, Coo). 
If in Case 1), the chain diverges toward (D, D_oo), then it proceeds down the right 
hand side of the diagram in Figure 2.6. Its behavior thus consists of alternation between 
(D, D_„) and (D, C_„) yielding score P with probability (1 — r) and T with probability 
z. The score obtained if the chain diverges in this direction is thus f (1 — z) + Tz = 
(1 — z) 4- 5z = 4z 4-1. In a similar fashion, divergence to (C, Q%,) has the chain moving 
left in Figure 2.6. The scores available in this case are with probability (1 — y) 
and ,9 B(1 — y) 4- 5"y = 3(1 — y) 4- Oy = 3 - 3y. Letting f_oo = fo[lûnm-»oo = 
(D, D_œ)] be the probability of going to (D, D_oo) starting 6om the initial state and 
f^o = f})[limn_oo = (C, Coo] be the probability of going to (C, Coo) starting from the 
initial state, then 
fra-Fm-ra(Majority, a, y) = ^-«,((1 - r) 4- 5z)) 4- f^(3(l - y) + Oy) 
= fLoo(4% 4-1) 4- (1 — fLoo)(3 — 3%/) 
To find and fLoo, denote the probability to get to (D, D_@o) from the state a as 
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Pa — Pa [l^&n—&oo '—' Oo] s tilGH 
f-00 = A) = ( 1 — y)P(C,Ci) + %/^(C^D_i) (2.1.1) 
P(C^D_i) 1 - y)P(C,C6) + %/P(D,D_a) (2.1.2) 
P(C,Co) = ( 1 - y)p(c,ci) + %/P(c,D_i) (2.1.3) 
P(f»^D_,)2 = ' a;p(D,c_i) + (1 — %)P(DrD_3) (2.1.4) 
(1- z)(/)(.D,D_a) " P(D^). -a)) = a:(p(D^)_a) - P(D,C_i)) (2.1.5) 
P(D,C_i) = 3:p(c,Co) + (1 — (2.1.6) 
=> z(j 0(D,C_i) - P(C,<%)) = (1-- z)(/)(O^D_,) - p(D,C_i)) (2.1.7) 
P(D^D_3) = a;/?(D,c_2) + (1 %)P(D,D_4) (2.1.8) 
(1 — Z)(P(D^)_*) - P(D^). -3)) = a:(P(D,D_8) — P(D.C-a)) (2.1.9) 
From (2.1.4), (2.1.5), and (2.1.6), 
(P(D,ZL(.+i)) - P(D,D_»)) =z/(%4- l)(f(D^D_n) - #D,C_(._i))) = 3^/(1 - " 
P(D,c_(,_g))) for m > 2. 
/)(C^)_n)) = 3^/(1 - yi(p(D,C_^_n) - P(D,C_ (n—2) 
ra=2 n=2 
=> 1 — /)(D^D_a) — ^/(l — 3)^(1 — P(r,C_i)) (2.1.11) 
2! 
since lim*-.*, = lim*-,*, ^  = 1 where % < 1/2. 
P(c,ci) = yf(c^)o) + (1 — y)f(o,C2) (2.1.12) 
f(C,Do) = Z/P(C^Di) + (1 - %/)P(C,Ci) (2.1.13) 
P(C,Ca) = yP(C,Di) + (1 - %/)P(C,Ca) (2.1.14) 
=> (1 - y)(f(C,Cs) - f(C,C,)) = %/(P(C,<%) - f(C,Di)) (2.1.15) 
= %/p(c^)o) + (i — y)f(c,(%) (2.1.16) 
=> y(P(C,Ci) - P(C^)o)) = (1 - %/)(P(C,C,) — P(C,f>i)) (2.1.17) 
Prom (2.1.10), and (2.1.11), 
P(C,_D„_i) - P(C,D._a) = (1 — y)/%/(f(C,Cn) - P(C,Dn_i)) 
= (1 - %/)V^(f(c,c.+i) - P(C,C.)) for n > 2. 
OO oo 
yi(p(C^._i) - P(CrD*_:)) = (1 - y)V%/ yi(P(C,C.+i) - P(C,C»)) (2.1.18) 
n= 2 n=2 
=> 0 — P(C,Do) = (1 " %/)V^(0 — P(C,Ca)) (2.1.19) 
since lim^_ooP(c^)n_i) = limn_oo/)(c,c.) = 0 where y < 1/2. 
Now, there are seven equations and seven unknowns in (2.1.1), (2.1.2), (2.1.3), (2.1.7), 
(2.1.8), (2.1.9), and (2.1.12). Solving these equations, 
.P-oo = 2(1 — 2z)y*(l — %/)/((! — z — y + 2%y)(l — z — y)), 
= 1 - 2(1 - 2z)y*(l - y)/((l — z — %/ + 2%y)(l — % - %/)). 
Therefore, when 0 < % < 1/2 and 0 < y < 1/2, 
Fra-for-Ts*(Major%, z, y) 
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f_oo(f(l -z)4- Tz)) + %,(#(! - y) + gy) 
= (f(l - z) + Tz)(l - 2z)%/(l - y)/((l - z - y + 2zy)(l — z - y)) 
+(A(1 -y) + ^y)(l - (1 - 2z)y^(l - y)/((l - z - y + 2zy)(l - z - y)) 
= (3 — 3%/) + (4z + 3y - 2)(1 - 2z)y^(l - y)/((l - z - y + 2zy)(l - z - y)). 
In Case 2), fL<%„ the probability to go to (D, D_(%,), is 1. Therefore, when 0 < z < 1/2 
and 1/2 < y < 1, 
^a-for-Tof (Majority, z, y) = P(1 - z) + Tz = 4z + 1. 
In Case 3), fL, the probability to go to (C, Cœ) is 1. Therefore, when 1/2 < z < 1 
and 0 < y < 1/2, 
frA-for-ro*(Majonty, z, y) = A(1 - y) + S'y = 3 - 3y. 
Those three functions agree on their boundary except at z = 1/2 and y = 1/2 which 
is a singular point of this fingerprint. Therefore we cannot say that non-finite state 
machines have continuous fingerprints. The Majority, however, has an almost everywhere 
continuous fingerprint which can be found algebraically. 
Notice the probability to go to (D, D_oo) is 1 in Case 2) which means the fingerprint 
agrees with A11D. Likewise, the fingerprint agrees with A11C in Case 3) because the 
probability to go to (C, Cm) is 1. 
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2.1.5 Applications of fingerprints 
Given a strategy, «S, for the iterated prisoner's dilemma that requires a minimum of 
k<n states, there are a very large number of different finite state representations of 
in n states even when n — A has modest size. An advantage of fingerprinting is that 
the fingerprint is indifferent to the implementation of strategy and detects only how the 
strategy plays. 
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 each show a collection of 30 fingerprints taken from a replication of 
the noise-free experiment reported in [14]. These populations consist of 3016-state finite 
state machines. In Figure 2.7, the population consists of 26 machines playing a two-state 
implementation of Tit — for — T at, three playing a variation of Tit — For — Tot that is 
vulnerable to strings of defections after an initial cooperation (these have blurry lower 
left comers on their fingerprints the third eleventh and twentieth fingerprints in reading 
order), and one playing always cooperate. Looking at the fingerprints immediately 
suggests that Tit — For — Tat is the dominant strategy, and one can rapidly spot the 
AMC player. The three variant players are also exposed by their fingerprints. 
In Figure 2.8, we see a more diverse population made up of machines using five 
states. The population is both more complex in terms of its dynamics and also has more 
complex finite state machines. 
The analysis of the fingerprints shown in Figure 2.7 is not too difficult because they 
are very close to (and in 26 cases identical to) fingerprints of known strategies. Compiling 
a library of fingerprints for relatively simple strategies permits the rapid detection of 
those strategies by visual or automatic inspection. This in turn permits the analysis to 
concentrate on more complex or unique strategies. The fingerprints in Figure 2.8 cannot 
be subjected to the same sort of snap analysis, but at least their complexity is visible. 
This technique will be expanded and automated with the clustering technique described 
in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5. 
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Figure 2.7 Fingerprints fra-fm—Tot(«S, z, y) where z varies over a 30 mem­
ber population produced with an evolutionary algorithm. 
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Figure 2.8 Fingerprints fra-for-To*(<S, z, y) where z varies over a 30 mem­
ber population produced with an evolutionary algorithm. 
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2.2 The fingerprints of the iterated two player's games with n, 
possible moves 
There are many games that two players play simultaneously with m possible moves 
{Mi, Mg,.M*}. Each of them has n by n pay off matrix F = (p#) where p# is the 
score earned by a player when he responds Mj and the opponent responds M*. The game, 
#oc& Paper Scissors, is one of two player's games where % is three. Rock breaks scissors, 
scissor cut paper, and paper covers rock. In other words, rock beats scissors, scissor 
beat paper, and paper beats rock. Suppose the players continue their plays indefinitely. 
Then there are a lot of available strategies. Many strategies can be represented with a 
finite state machine. 
Definition 2.2.1. is a s(ro(ayy /or playing (wo pfayer's gome with n possiMe moves, 
(hen a s(ra(egy JA(X, Zi, Zg,..., z^) is a s(ra(egy which has a pro6a6#i(y z* q/TondomZy 
choosing D* /or each 1 < i < n and otherwise uses (he response o/ s(ra(egy ^4. jf 
5" is (he s(ra(egy space (his can 6e viewed as (he /unc(ion J A : S' x F i-» S where 
F = {(Z%, Zg,. . . , Z*)|zi, Zg, . . . , Z^ € A, 0 < Z% + Zg -| + Zn < 1}. 
When Zi + Zg 4 H z^, = 1 the strategy A is not used and the resulting behavior 
is called the random strategy with play probabilities (zi,zg,..., z„). 
Lemma 2.2.2. 7%e s(m(egy JA(zi,zg,...,z^),yi, yg,. .,%/n) w egwivaient (o 
yi4-(l — y%—yg— - — %/n)zi, yg + (l — y% — yg— - — %4»)a:g, ., y» + (1 — 
m %/*)%„). 
Fmqf The probability of randomly choosing D* is % plus the probability of using to 
JA(A, z%, zg,..., Zn) times z< for each 1 < i < n. O 
Deûnition 2.2.3. A /ingerprin( F^(^, zi,zg,... ,z„) wi(h 0 < Zi + zg -I H z» < 1, 
and «S a s(nz(a/y is (he /unc(ion (ha( re(ums (he eayec(ed score of s(nz(egy ^ agains( 
&T^4(^4, z%, Zg, ' * ; . 
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For example, in Rock-Paper-Scissors 
FwumW&x* (/UwoyaPoper, z, y, z, ) 
= acore(poper, rock) (1 — y - z) + acore(poper, paper) - y + acore(poper, gciaaora) - z. 
Let 8core(paper,rock)=l, Bcore(paper,paper)=0, and score(paper,scissors)=-l then 
( AZtuoy aPoper) = z — z. 
fgeot(AZwa3/aPaper) = 2z + y — 1. 
where the strat^y Aepeot r^eats the opponent's last move and the strategy Beof chooses 
the move that beats the opponent's last move. 
Lemma 2.2.4. Jf ond ^4 ore atrotegiea repreaentoMe /inite atofe mochinea, ond 
(he Afor&ow chom on oZZ poirs of ocfiona ond aiotea /or (heae afmtegiea ia o cofnmu-
ntcoWng cZoaa, (hen fx(<S,z%,zg,...,z^,) *a con&ntious over ^ = {(z%, zg,...,Zn)|0 < 
Zi, Zg,.. . ,Zm < 1, 0 < Zi + Zg + - Zn < 1}. 
Proq/i Let 5" be a collection of states which consists of all possible ordered pairs (A%&, Af)Z) 
where Afi and A; are the last response and the state of ^ and Af, emd f are the last re­
sponse and the state of JA(.4, z%, zg,..., z^) respectively. At each time step, the strategy 
«S has only one possible state transition, as does Thus, the only indeterminate change 
in each state is the action by «A4(.A, Zi, Zg,..., z»). Elach row of the transition matrix of 
its Aforkou choin has n entries such that the strategy X responds appropriately in one 
entry and inappropriately in the other entries. Therefore, the transition probabilities in 
the Afor&ou chotn are z* or 1 — (z% -I 1- Z;_i + z^+% -I H z*) for each i. Because 
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the rhain is a communicating class and its state space is finite, it is recurrent. Thus it 
has the unique stationary distribution [17]. The vector representing the distribution will 
have entries that are rational functions in and 1 — (zi 4 k 4- a%+i -I 1- z») 
for each i because it is determined by row multiplication on the transition matrix of the 
Markou chain. The values of all possible score are finite, so there are no singularities 
over Thus, is continuous over O 
Theorem 2.2.5. and ^4 are strategies nqwesentobZe ^nite state machines, then 
... ,3*) is continuous overf = {(zi,Tg,... ,%m)|0 < zi,zg,... ,2^ < 1,0 < 
-f Zg 4- - ' + ^ 1}. 
fyoo/ Let 5" be a collection of states which consists of all possible ordered pairs (M^t, M^Z) 
where Afi and t are the last response find the state of «S and Mf and Z are the last re­
sponse and the state of Zi,... ,z„), respectively. We can construct a Markou 
chain over 5" with transition probabilities that are linear functions of the values of 2% for 
each i. The state space, 6", of Marker chains may be decomposed as 5^ = T U CiU,..., 
where T" consists of transient states and Ci, ... are closed, disjoint, recurrent commu­
nicating classes [15]. By .Lemma 2.2.4 each communicating class within this Mar too 
chain will give a continuous fingerprint over f. The transient states leading to the 
recurrent communicating classes must also give probabilities that are products of and 
1 — (zi 4 k a%_i 4- a\+i 4 1- z„) for each i for entering any of the recurrent com­
municating classes. If transient states leading to the recurrent communicating classes 
don't have a loop, the resulting fingerprint is a sum of polynomial multiples of contin­
uous functions over Otherwise, the probability for entering any of the recurrent 
communicating classes is a power series. Therefore the resulting fingerprint is a sum of 
power series multiples of continuous functions over ^ and it is continuous because a 
fingerprint is bounded by the definition. O 
Corollary 2.2.6. TfiS and A are strategies representatfe finite state machines, then 
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(.4, z%, Zg,..., Zn) w d*j^ieremf*a6Ze over 
Fmo/ In the proof of Theorem 2.2.5 the fingerprint value is sum of continous functions. 
Each term is of the form 
/ 3"2i ' - ; 
r(zi,z2,...,z„) . \ 
g(z%, Zg, ..., z*) 
where r is the power series and the polynomials p and g have no common factors. 
Furthermore, bounded power series and rational functions are known to be in C°° over 
their domain. Therefore the fingerprint is in C°° over O 
2.3 Metrics in the space of fingerprints 
In order to analyze or compare different game strategies, we need a metric. Because 
we know that fingerprints of game strategies represented by finite state machines are 
continuous and bounded functions, they are in Z,* space which is a metric space induced 
with 1,2 norm. Given fingerprints and /g of strategies of two player's game with two 
moves, let d = Jo (/g — /i)^. Then dis a metric in the fingerprint space of strategies 
of two player's game. When we compute the difference between two fingerprints, we use 
a finite number of sample points so we need the finite sample version about the metric. 
Let d = where S is set of sample points. 
2.4 Data structures for game playing strategies. 
There are many data structures used to store game strategies [1]. In this thesis we 
use finite state machines because many other data structures can be specified as ânite 
state machines. In Section 4.3 we compare the result of evolving different data structures 
that store game strategies. Now we introduce other data structures used to store game 
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strategies and show that they can be specified in finite states machines. 
Logical Formulas 
Name Parity Definition 
T 0 Constant - logical true. 
F 0 Constant - logical false. 
0 Input, opponents previ­
ous actions, : = 1,2,3. 
Not 1 Logical not, inverts truth 
value. 
Del* 1 Delay line: returns true 
when first called and its 
last input thereafter. 
Say 1 Repeats its input. 
And 2 Logical and, true only if 
all inputs true. 
Or 2 Logical or, true if any in­
puts are true. 
Nand 2 Logical nand, inverted 
and. 
Nor 2 Logical nor, inverted or. 
Xor 2 Logical exclusive or, logi­
cal inequality. 
*Used in one set of simulations, absent in the other 
Ibble 2.2 Terminals and operations used by logic trees. 
The operations used in our logical formulas are given in Table 2.2. We map false to 
cooperate and true to defect. 
ISAc lists 
An ISAc list is a vector, or array, of ISAc nodes. An ISAc node is a quadruple (a; b; 
act; jmp) where a and b are indices for a data vector, act is an action that the ISAc node 
may take, and jmp is a specification of where to jump, if the action happens to be a jump 
action. The data vector holds inputs, scratch variables, and constants. In other words, 
everything we might give to a computer program implementing a game playing strategy. 
An ISAc list comes equipped with a fixed boolean test used by every node. Execution in 
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an ISAc list is controlled by an instruction pointer. The operation of an ISAc list is as 
follows. We start with the instruction pointer at the beginning of the ISAc list, indexing 
the zeroth node. Using the entries a, b, act, jump of that node, we look up data item 
a and data item b in the data vector and apply the boolean test to them. If the test 
is true, we perform the action in the act field of the node, otherwise we do nothing. If 
that action is "jump" we load the contents of the jmp field into the instruction pointer. 
We then increment the instruction pointer. Because of jump statements, the objects we 
are dealing with can have infinite loops. In any environment that uses ISAc structures, 
a limit is placed on the total number of instructions that can be executed before fitness 
evaluation is terminated. Early termination is a penalty and so permits evolution to 
remove ISAc lists with infinite loops. 
Markov Chains and Look-Up Tables 
The Markov chains and look-up tables have a chromosome consisting of a table of 
2" probabilities of cooperation indexed by the 2" possible ways that a finite number of 
the opponent's previous moves could be made. The entries in the table describing the 
Markov rhaina are real numbers in the range [0,1] storing the probability of cooperation. 
Look-up tables are like Markov chains save that the probability of cooperation was either 
1 or 0. 
Artificial Neural Nets 
An artificial neural net [11] has neurons with inputs and outputs and intrarneuron 
connections that are analogous to biological synapses. Each connection has a weight, 
usually a real number, and a direction. The direction establishes which neuron is sending 
the message along the connection and which neuron is receiving. The character of a 
neuron is determined by its transfer function. This function computes the neuron's 
output from the sum of its weighted inputs. W%en functioning, a neuron follows these 
steps: first, the inputs from connected neurons are multiplied by their connection weights 
and summed; the neuron then passes that sum through its transfer function; then, the 
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Figure 2.9 (1) is an example of Markov Chain and (2) is the Look-Up Table 
for the strategy Tit-For-Tat. Previous moves are in the forms 




Figure 2.10 Feed forward neural net with four Heaviside neurons. 
The opponents last three actions used as inputs. A 
hidden layer with three neurons is used to drive a single 
output neuron. 
1/0 0/0 
1/0 ow 1/0 0/0 0/0 
0/0 
0/0 
Figure 2.11 The Gnite state machine which specifies the look-up 
table in Figure 2.4. 
result is sent along all of the neuron's output connections. The topology of the nets is 
diagrammed in Figure 2.10. The chromosome consists of the 12 connection weights, first 
for the three input neurons and then for the connections into the output neuron. 
Theorem 2.4.1. Zoot-up Zo&ka con 6e apeci/kd oa stote moc/wnea. 
Pnx/ The action of a strategy stored in a look-up table is determined by the oppo­
nent's previous finitely many moves. Let m be the number of the opponent's previous 
moves used to index the look-up table. We consider the opponent's previous moves as 
a string with length n, i.e. ZiZa...Zn_ia:m. Define the addition operator on strings to be 
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concatenation. Construct a finite state machine in the following way: We may assume 
the initial move is known. Construct 2""^ states with the Erst n — 1 digits of strings 
of possible opponent's previous moves and denote them as s^iZg.-.Tn-i]- Take transi­
tion from a^iZg.-.Tn-i] to + 0] with the move corresponding to the string 
TiZa...Zm_i 4- 0 in the look-up table if input is 0. Take transition from s[ziZ2...Zn-i] 
to + 1] with the move corresponding to the string %iZ3...Zn-i +1 in the 
look-up table if input is 1. This creates the same directed graph as a De Bruijn sequence 
with n — 1- bit binary words [21] for the machine sole communicating class. Clearly this 
finite state machine mimics the behavior of the look-up table. O 
Corollary 2.4.2. Zxxyic tneea omd orti/iciaZ newrW nets com 6e speci/ied in ^mte stote 
mocAwes 
froq/i In a logical formula terminals report opponent's moves and they determine the 
action of the strategy stored in a logical formula tree. Consider the number of terminals 
as the opponent's last number of actions in look up table. Similarly, an artificial neural 
net can be specified as a look-up table because input neurons read opponent's moves 
in an artificial neural net and we can consider the number of input neurons as the 
opponent's last moves. Therefore, logic trees and artificial neural nets can be specified 
as ânite state machines by Theorem 2.4.1. O 
Notice that Mor&ov cAoina cannot be specified as ânite states machines. The strategy 
stored in a Afortoo c/wzm has a continuous fingerprint and we can ând it using the 
method in Section 2.1.2. ISAc lists are a form of general computer program and so do 
not necessarily have computable fingerprints. 
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3 Visualization and analysis 
3.1 Multi-clustering 
A clustering algorithm is an exploratory technique for classifying data. Given a 
set of data, the clustering divides the data into tentative categories of objects. These 
categories are not known ahead of time. If they were then we would be working on a 
very different c&isai/ico#on problem. If the algorithm works well then the data items 
within a category are similar to one another and also not similar to items in the other 
categories. For the remainder of this chapter we will assume the data are sets of points 
in Euclidean space. Examine Figures 3.2, 3.5, 3.6, and 3.8. These data sets are clouds 
of 2000 points inside the unit square [0,1] x [0,1] in R* We refer to these as the double 
ball, donut-and-ball, horseshoe, and spiral data sets respectively. 
The goal is to see if we can make a clustering algorithm discover, for each of these 
twelve data sets, the natural partition into two or three more-or-less contiguous clouds 
of points. The double ball data sets are easy for t-means clustering, the other three 
are, with one exception, constructively impossible for k-means clustering. In Figure 
3.1 we see the performance of Euclidean metric based t-means clustering on the first 
donut-and-ball data set. Clearly, it does not discover the designed structure of this data 
set. Let us review the k-means clustering algorithm, Algorithm 3.1.1, as a prelude to 
understanding its failure. 
In this case we are using the Euclidean metric to measure the distance from points 
to cluster centers. Cluster centers are computed by taking the average position of the 
Figure 31 The result of using t-means clustering with two (up) and six 
(down) clusters on the first donut-and-ball data set. Cluster 
membership is shown by glyph type. 
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points in a cluster. The Euclidean metric will thus try to group points into compact 
Euclidean shapes. If we take the Voronoi tiles [16] induced by the cluster centers, then 
the members of each cluster are within a tile and are in fact the intersections of Vbronoi 
tiles with the data set. For the set of points in Figure 3.1 it is easy to see that no selection 
of cluster centers in R^ will pick out the two obvious groupings of points. In fact the 
simple partition of the plane with a single line is the only possibility when there are two 
clusters and the upper clustering in Figure 3.1 is exactly this with the line cutting the 
points neatly in half. 
Algorithm 3.1.1. k-means 
Tnput; ^ aet <9 o/pointa in R" 
^ .4 defined number & q/ cJuatera. 
3^ ^4 bound .B on the number o/ cycfea permitted 
Output; .4 category/unction 
C : 5^ —» {0,..., & — 1}. 
DetaiZa; 
Ckooae t distinct point» in 5 aa initio/ cfuater centers. 
Repeat 
Xaaign each point to the cfuater u/hoae center 
it ia cloaeat to, treating tiea at random*. 
.Recompute c/uater center» aa the average q/ off 
pointa in the cfuater. 
f/ntif ^no pointa change their cfuater aaaignment or 
B cyclea hawe occurred^" j 
^Report the aaaignment o/ pointa to cZuatera oa C. 
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* /or reoZ-voZued data aucA tiea aefdom occur 
-f /or reof-wohied dota B ia aefdom required 
The output of Algorithm 3.1.1 ia a category function, 
C : <9 —> {0,..., k — 1}. 
If two points i and j have the property that C(i) = C(j) then we say that i and j are in 
t/ie aome duster. We also say that % ia in cfuater number C(i). The category function 
C is a convenient mathematical way of summarizing the clusters. It gives the number 
of the cluster containing a point. It is worth noting that the Erst cluster in the k-means 
algorithm given here is cluster zero. 
A feature of k-means clustering is that it is sensitive to its random initialization. If 
we were to re-run the k-means algorithm used to produce the two pictures in Figure 3 .1 
with a different set of initial cluster centers we would often get a different clustering. In 
performing multi-clustering we will exploit this sensitivity to initialization. 
3.2 Definition of multi-clustering 
Suppose that we run k-means with too many clusters. In the bottom picture in 
Figure 3.1 we see that running k-means on the Erst donut-and-ball data set with six 
clusters correctly discovered the central grouping. It also broke the donut into five 
pieces. In this clustering every pair of points that are in a cluster together belong 
together. The problem is that most of the pairs of points in the donut are in different 
clusters. Running a k-means clustering with an excess of clusters gives information 
about who belongs together, but in a one-sided fashion. Positive examples Eire correct 
while negative examples are uninformative. 
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The key observation that leads to multi-clustering is that any particular k-means 
clustering with an excessively large number of clusters yields useful information about 
which pairs of points should be associated. Rerunning the k-means algorithm yields 
potentially information about which points should be associated. If we could 
group information from multiple k-means clusterings then we would get a much better 
notion of which points should be associated. 
Informally, k-means based multi-clustering proceeds as follows. The user picks some 
number TV of clusterings to perform. He then picks a distribution D of possible numbers 
of clusters. The algorithm performs JV clusterings, selecting the number of clusters in 
a given clustering from Z). Before clustering the algorithm initializes a set of pairwise 
connection strengths for each pair of points with an initial strength of zero. Whenever a 
k-means clustering places two points in a cluster together the algorithm increases their 
connection strength by 1. We then divide all the connection strengths by the number of 
clusterings performed to yield connections strengths in the interval [0,1]. After all the 
clustering is done and the final connection strengths have been computed a cutoff value 
C is chosen and only connections with strength exceeding C are retained. If we view 
the surviving connections as edges of a combinatorial graph [22] that has the data items 
as vertices, then the clusters are the connected components of this graph. 
At first glance this algorithm makes the situation worse, not better. When perform­
ing a k-means clustering, one needs only choose the number of clusters k. For multi-
clustering we must choose the number of clusterings the distribution Z) of numbers 
of clusters, and the cutoff value C. While only limited testing has been performed thus 
far, it seems that the choice of D is soft, requiring only that D have a broad range of 
values. Theorem 3.2.5 shows that the choice of JV is not critical as long as TV is large 
enough. Finally, the algorithm itself can give guidance as to how to choose the cutoff 
value C. 
When performing k-means clustering it is possible to compute the tightness of clusters 
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and use this to select a "good" clustering from many attempts. Multi-clustering yields 
a nice tool for allowing the user to see if there is a natural number of clusters. We call 
this tool the The cut-plot is a function that maps possible cut values onto the 
number of connected components that would result if the given cut value were used. 
The shape of the cut-plot yields information about "natural" numbers of clusters. 
Once the algorithm has computed the connection weights for all pairs of points, the 
algorithm then computes, for each relevant value of C, the number of clusters (connected 
components) that would result if we used that value of C. Note that the relevant values 
of C are those that appear as edge weights together with 0 and 1. Cut-plots for all four 
donut-and-ball data sets are shown in Figure 3.3. The cut plot gives guidance as to 
the correct number of clusters. The designed number of clusters in the four data sets is 
two. Data set one, with the largest gap between the clusters, is the easiest. Data sets 
two and three are of intermediate difficulty. Data set four is the hardest, having the 
largest dispersion of points and smallest gap between the donut and ball. Notice that 
all four cut-plots have broad, Eat regions giving many values of C for which the number 
of clusters is two. The easiest data set gives two clusters even at a cut value of zero; the 
large gap means that points in the donut and the ball were never grouped together. The 
hardest data set has the narrowest region where the number of clusters is two, and the 
only one with a non-trivial Sat region where the number of clusters is more than two. 
If purely random data were fed to the algorithm then the cut-plot should also inform 
the user that the data has no cluster structure. The cut-plot would lack the Hat regions 
that correspond to the discovery of a spatial gap in the data. In order to check this 
assertion a random set of data, distributed uniformly at random within a circle of radius 
0.447 centered on (0.5,0.5), was created and multi-clustered with the same parameters 
as the other data sets. The resulting cut-plot is shown in Figure 3.4. The Eat space 
corresponds to a single cluster. As soon as the cut value becomes high enough to 
disconnect the cluster no additional Eat spots appear. 
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Figure 3.2 Partitioning of the donut-and-ball data sets by multi-clustering 
with 60 clusterings of 10-100 k-means clusters and a cut thresh­










Figure 3.3 Cut-plots for the donut-and-ball data sets. Top-to-bottom these 





Figure 3.4 The cut-plot for a random data set using 60 clusterings of 10-50 
clusters. 
Let us examine the meaning of having a region of the cut-plot where there is one 
cluster, as happened for donut-and-ball data sets 2-4. What this means is that for any 
two points there is a path joining them so that adjacent members of the path were in 
a k-means cluster together at some point during the multi-clustering. Consider what 
this means geometrically. For every gap in the data set, a k-means cluster had members 
on both sides of the gap at some point during multi-clustering. This is also useful 
information for setting the parameters of the multi-clustering. If a k-means clustering 
has a small number of clusters then the average cluster size is larger. This makes it 
easier for clusters to bridge gaps. Changing the distribution of cluster sizes to use a 
large minimum number of clusters may eliminate the one-cluster region of the cut-plot. 
The cut-plot even has the potential to permit the user to see clusters-within-clusters. 
A data set with several regions, well separated, that each posses several clusters would 
yield a cut-plot with a Bat region corresponding to discovery of the large gap between 
clusters of clusters and a distinct Eat region where the clusters in each region separated. 
This would require a fairly implausible agreement in the size of inter-cluster gaps within 
the various regions and would probably not be too neat in practice. 
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Figure 3.5 Partitioning of the double ball data sets by multi-clustering with 
60 clusterings of 10-100 k-means clusters and a cut threshold of 
C = 0.42. Cluster membership is shown by glyph type. 
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The formal statement of the k-means version of the multi-clustering algorithm fol­
lows. 
Algorithm 3.2.1. k-means multi-clustering 
input; ^ .4 aet ^ o/r points in R" 
^ number TV o/ cfuaferinga to per/brm. 
dwfr*6u(*on D q/ numbera o/ duatera. 
^ weight cutoj^ C, 0 < C < 1 
Output: ^4 cotegory /unction 




Znitio/ize on r x r motriz M of poirwiae connection 
atrengtha to contoin off zeroa 
Aepeot TV timea 
defect on integer d /rom D 
k-meona cfuater 5" with d cfuatera. 
fbr eoch {i, j} € f x with ij in the aome c/uater 
increment M[i][;] 
increment Af [j] [i] 
end fbr 
end Aepeot 
TVormoZize Af/i/^f/ by dividing eoch entry o/ Af/i/^/ by TV 
Denote by W the groph on 5" with edge weighta M/i//%/ 
fbr f eguofa 0 to TV 
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Construct gmph G with y (G) = 5", f7(G) poira o/ 
pointa /or which M[i][j] > Z/N 
Compute number 0/ connected componenta c 0/ G 
Add the point (Z/TV, c) to the cut-pfot 
end fbr 
fbr 1 with < z < /(z) = / (#). 
BuiZd a new graph on 5 with edgea where M[i][;] > G 
Enumerate the connected componenta 0/ thia groph. 
C/i/ ia the number 0/ the connected component containing i. 
The mathematical properties of the weighted graph TV generated during multi t-
means clustering and the cut-plot are worth consideration. They show that the cut plot 
is an approximation of an invariant descriptor of the data set depending only on D and 
also that only r — 1 cut values are significant. 
Lemma 3.2.2. 7%e cut-pZot ia monotone non-decneaaing. 
Proof. Denote by IV the graph with all edges of weight nor exceeding z removed. 
The the cut-plot /(z) is the number of connected components in W. As z increases the 
number of edges in can only remain the same or decrease. The number of connected 
components in TV can thus only remain the same or increase. It follows that /(%) is 
non decreasing. O 
Recall that for a graph G, y (G) denotes the vertex set and E(G) denotes the edges 
set of G. 
Lemma 3.2.3. .Let # be o connected component of W containing a uertez ^doto point) 
g E 5", and fet % be a connected component 0/ W ako containing a. 7/ /(z) = /(z ) 
t/ien y(ff) = y(#). 
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Figure 3.6 Partitioning of the Horseshoe data sets by multi-clustering with 
60 clusterings of 10-100 k-means clusters and a cut threshold of 
0.42. Cluster membership is shown by glyph type. Note that the 
fourth data set can be correctly clustered with standard k-means 
clustering. 
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Pnoo/. Since /(z) = /(z) it follows that W and TV have the same number of con-
nected components. Assume WOLOG that z < z. Then either W = W or W has 
fewer edges than W. In addition, as edges can only be removed as we increase the cut 
value from 2 to 2', all edges of W are edges of W. This means that V(A") C y(#). 
If y (Zf) hag vertices that are members of multiple connected components in W then 
we contradict the hypothesis that /(z) = /(z). But if y(ZT) is the set of vertices of a 
single connected component in W then it is y (A"). O 
A mozimoZ aponning (nee in an edge weighted graph is a spanning tree such that 
the sum of edge weights is as large as possible. Such a tree exists, need not be unique, 
and can be constructed using a simple variant of KruskaTs algorithm [22] in which most 
expensive rather than least expensive edges are used to build the tree. Recall that a 
spanning tree contains a unique path joining any two vertices in the graph [22]. 
Lemma 3.2.4. 7%e Zoweat weigM edge on ZAe unique joining Wo uerficea in o 
mozimaZ aponning (nee ia Zeoa( oa forge oa (Ae foweaf weighs edge on ony po(A joining 
<Aoae vefticea. 
Froq/i Assume we are working within a connected, weighted graph. Let % and u be a 
pair of vertices in the graph and let w be the lowest weight of any edge on the path 
in the maximal spanning tree connecting them. Let e be an edge in the path in the 
spanning tree from % to u possessing weight w. If we delete all edges of weight w or 
less, then either u and r are in distinct connected components or there is a path joining 
them on which every edge has weight exceeding w. In the former case we are done. 
In the latter case, examine the spanning tree with e deleted, creating two sub-trees of 
the spanning maximal tree whose vertices contain, between them, all the vertices in the 
graph. Then the new path from n to v contains an edge with a vertex in each tree. The 






Figure 3.7 Cut-plots for all four horse-shoe data sets. Note that a range 
of cut values roughly centered on 0.42 yields two clusters for all 
data sets. 
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a spanning tree with higher weight than the maximal spanning tree, and we achieve a 
contradiction. O 
Recall that a spanning forest for a graph with more than one connected component 
is a collection of spanning trees for each of the graphs connected components. 
Theorem 3.2.5. 7%e cwf-pZof /(z) is o non-decreasing step /unction wi(A ot most r — m 
steps, Wiere m is the number 0/ connected component in IV. TTiese steps occur ot the 
weights 0/ the edges 0/ o mozimof spanning /brest of TV. 
Proof! We already have that the cut-plot is non-decreasing from Lemma 3.2.2. Fix a 
maximal spanning forest T of IV, consisting of the selection of a maximal spanning tree 
for each connected component of TV. Pick any two vertices in the same connected com­
ponent of TV. Lemma 3.2.4 implies that they remain in the same connected component 
of TV until z reaches the minimal weight of an edge in the unique path in T connecting 
them, after which they are in distinct connected components. It follows that there is a 
step in /(z) if z is the weight of a lowest weight edge on a path connecting two vertices. 
All weights of edges of T are such weights because an edge is the only edge in the path 
connecting its ends. If /(z) has a jump then there must be two vertices in the same 
connected component at cut values below z and in different ones for cut values exceeding 
z. This forces z to be an edge weight of T. A well known property of spanning forests 
says that number of edges in T is r — m. O 
Theorem 3.2.5 explains exactly what the cut-plot looks like. There are possibly as 
many as edge weights, where r is the number of data points, but only r — m of them 
are places where the value of the cut-plot can change. The edge weights of a spanning 
forest are the critical values of /(z) at which its value jumps. The flat places that indicate 
numbers of clusters occur between these critical values. The cut-plot, however, is an od 
hoc outcome of a stochastic algorithm. It would be nice to know it is approximating a 
stable object. 
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Definition 3.2.6. Suppose that i, j E 5". Z^tp^j be the probability that i and j wiZZ be 
in the gome chafer if we pick a number o/ cZusters d /rum the distribution D and then 
cZuster 5" with ^4Zgorithm j.T using d clusters. 
Since D is a distribution on a Snite set (more clusters than data items is nonsensical) 
and the number of possible outcomes of Algorithm 3.1.1 is also finite there is no problem 
with pij existing. It is a well defined probability. 
Definition 3.2.7. Z^et PK* be the edge weighted graph with vertez set 5" and degree 
weights p;j, treating weight zero edges as non-edges. Zet /*(z) be the cut-pZot derived 
/rom IV as a staWard cut pZot is derived _/rom W. 
Theorem 3.2.8. ^4s we increase TV, Algorithm 5.^.^ creates graphs TV that are succes­
sively better approximations to Ty*. Zitewise, cut-pZots /(z) approach /*(z). 
Proof. Adopt the variables from Algorithm 3.2.1. Using the un-normalized version of 
M[i][j], notice that 
Z/im M [i] [;] 
TV^ oo TV 
The theorem follows. O 
The need for the distribution D is worth at least a brief discussion. If the number of 
clusters requested from the t means algorithm is left the same in each set of clusterings 
then there is relatively little change in the position of some cluster centers, or, perhaps 
more correctly, there are small regions of R" that contain a cluster center in a large 
majority of the clusterings. This is true for the two-dimensional data sets used in this 
chapter; we conjecture it is true in general. For the data used in this chapter leaving the 
number of clusters computed the same across a multi-clustering resulted in spuriously 
high connection strengths between pairs of points near these repeating cluster centers. 
Changing the number of clusters requested from the k-means algorithm through a range 
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of values eliminated this effect. At present the number of clusters is chosen uniformly 
at random in a broad range. There may well be better choices for the distribution of 
number of clusters. In addition it may be that the increase in the connection strength 
given for being in a cluster together should vary with the number of clusters. This 
suggest that we add one over the cluster sizes to the connection strengths; we note that 
this would make computing the cut-plot slightly more complex. Also we might apply 
entropy to the outcome clusters. Entropy can be used as a measure of randomness in a 
set of clusters. Entropy is defined in terms of a discrete random event z, with possible 
states as: #(z) = — loggThat is, the entropy of the event z is the 
sum, over all possible outcomes % of z, of the product of the probability of outcome i 
times the log of the probability of i. This can be also applied to a general probability 
distribution, rather than a discrete-valued event. Let S be a data set with TV elements 
and C = {Co, Cg, a set of clusters. Then the probability of outcome Q is 
Thus the entropy for our data set with a clustering is #(C) = — 23 ^  log; This 
might better tell us how data are distributed in the clustering that we found. If the 
entropy is calculated when the number of clusters increases in a cut-plot then the jump 
in entropy is small when small clusters split off. It is a major advantage that we can see 
the size of clusters with the depth of jump between intervals. In the standard algorithm 
all jumps of the cut-plot are size 1, which gives no information about the size of clusters 
splitting apart. 
3.3 Results for two cluster data 
The Euclidean t-means multi-clustering algorithm was tested on the twelve two-
cluster data sets shown in Figures 3.2, 3.5, and 3.6. Each of these is a set of 2000 points 
in the unit square [0,1] x [0,1]. The bounding box for the depiction of each data set 
coincides with the unit square in the figures. The spacing of the two natural clusters 
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was modified to create problems of varying difficulty. For all twelve data sets, multi-
clustering was run with TV = 60, D chosen to be the uniform distribution on [10,100], 
and C = 0.42. 
The double ball data sets shown in Figure 3.5, were included as a check that multi-
clustering could still solve problems that k-means clustering can solve. These data sets 
are linearly separable (a single line can divide the two obvious clusters). The multi-
clustering algorithm correctly clustered these data sets. 
The donut-and-ball data sets, shown in Figure 3.2, with cut-plots shown in Figure 3.3, 
were created to defeat standard Euclidean k-means clustering. The two natural clusters 
can only be separated by k-means if we change the coordinate system, e.g. to polar 
coordinates. While this change of coordinates is itself a way of making the data linearly 
separable, it is a kind of step that requires hand examination of the data: a special 
purpose solution. The minimum distance between points in the two natural clusters as 
well as the diameter of the data set as a ball were varied across the four donut-and-ball 
data sets. With the given parameter settings, the multi-clustering algorithm correctly 
found the two natural clusters for all four data sets. 
The horseshoe data sets, shown in Figure 3.6, with cut-plots shown in Figure 3.7, 
serve as examples of data sets with two natural clusters that cannot be correctly captured 
by Euclidean k-means clustering and which cannot be amended by changing to polar 
coordinates. There may be a re-coordinatization of the space that will separate the 
two natural clusters, but discovering it would require a substantial effort. The fourth 
horse-shoe data set is an exception - the horseshoes are placed to permit a line cutting 
between two clusters. Multi-clustering with the stated parameters again correctly found 
the two natural clusters for all four sets of horseshoe data. 
For both the donut-and-ball and the horseshoe data, the cut-plots give an unambigu­
ous call of two clusters. The more difficult data sets, such ag donut-and-ball four and 
horse shoe two, have the shortest Eat spots at two. Other than the Eat spots with the 
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cut-plot at one, signifying that the data set has not yet fallen apart into more than one 
cluster, the Sat spots at two are the largest in each of these plots. 
3.4 Results for three cluster data 
The multi-clustering algorithm performed well on the data with two natural clusters. 
As a next step, data with three natural clusters in the same general class as the horseshoe 
data sets were presented to the algorithm. These are the sptmf data sets. These data 
sets are similar to the other data sets; each hag 2000 points in the unit square. They 
are shown in Figure 3.8. 
The parameter settings for the two-cluster data sets did not work immediately on 
the spiral data sets. The cut-plots, shown in Figure 3.9, posses broad Bat regions of cut 
values that yields three clusters. Changing C to be 0.33 yielded a correct clustering of 
all four data sets. The Eat region of cuts that yield three clusters is the broadest in all 
the cut-polots. The cut-plot again makes an unambiguous call of the designed number 
of clusters for all four data sets. 
3.5 Discussion and conclusions 
For the twelve two-cluster data sets a single collection of parameter settings (TV = 60, 
D uniform on [10,100], C = 0.42) correctly found two natural clusters. The cut-plots 
all show a broad band of cut values for which the same two clusters are obtained. 
This demonstrates that the algorithm can perform well on relatively clean data that 
nevertheless are not well suited to direct partition via the Euclidean metric. The single 
experiment with random data gave a clear signal that there were no natural clusters. 
We conjecture that the t-means multi-clustering algorithm will work well on any data 
set with the type of contiguous but not linearly separable clusters in the test data used 
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Figure 3.8 Partitioning of the spiral data sets by multi-clustering with 60 
clusterings of 10-100 k-means clusters and a cut threshold of 






Figure 3.9 Cut-plots for all four spiral data sets. Note that a range of cut 
values roughly centered roughly on 0.3 yields three clusters for 
all data sets. 
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here as well as correctly suggesting that the data do not have these sorts of clusters 
separated by gaps when this is the case. 
The algorithm also worked well on the four data sets with three natural clusters. 
When the algorithm was re-run with the setting from the two-cluster data sets, four 
clusters were obtained for the Erst of the data sets: a cluster near the center and three 
partial limbs of the spirals. Examining the cut-plots, shown in Figure 3.9, suggested 
that there were three clusters and that C = 0.33 was a cutoff value that would display 
them. The software was re-run with this cut value and three clusters were obtained for 
all four data sets. 
The cut-plot is the most novel feature of multi-clustering. It gives advice on the 
number of clusters in the data as well as estimating their strength, in the form of the 
broadness of the area of the cut-plot that yields a given number of clusters. This sort 
of simple summary of aspects of the structure of the data is potentially useful. 
All of the data sets used contained 2000 data points. Run time for each multi-
clustering was a few minutes on a desk-top PC. The k-means multi-clustering shares 
with k-means clustering its sensitivity to random initialization. Theorem 3.2.8 shows, 
increasing TV washes out this sensitivity. 
3.5.1 The hierarchy of clusters 
One of the major alternatives to k-means clustering for exploratory analysis is hi­
erarchical clustering. This technique starts with a data set and then iteratively joins 
nearest neighbors, replacing those neighbors with their weighted average or, possibly, 
their set union. This yields a tree-structured or hierarchical cluster. Sub-trees of the full 
tree are groups of related objects and the tree provides a taxonomy of how the objects 
are related. The choice of the appropriate ways of comparing groups of data points, 
either as weighted averages or sets, is a vexing problem. There are a number of choices 
of methods for dealing with comparisons involving the non-leaf nodes of the resulting 
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trees. The correct choice varies with the type of problem being solved. 
Multi-clustering can provide a tree-structured hierarchy of clusters as well. This 
hierarchy is created from a set of nested graphs. As we increase C, existing clusters fall 
apart into smaller clusters. Each time a connected component of the weighted graph 
described by the weight matrix M in Algorithm 3.2.1 gains connected components, we 
obtain a branching in the tree. This tree has the potential for non-binary branching, 
though in practice this will be rare as it requires a tie in the weights of the maximal 
spanning forest. Non-binary branching at the root node is more likely as data sets with 
large gaps may yield a weighted graph with several connected components. Formally, 
Definition 3.5.1. TTie dendrogram o/c mu&i-cfusterin# is a (nee whose Zeoves one (he 
data items and whose interior nodes ore the clusters that occur /or some cut Wue C. 
The root of the tree is the entire (fata set. The descendants of a non-Zeqf node are the 
clusters that /brm the /Zrst time the c/uster represented that node /aZfs apart as the 
cut oafue is increased. 
The dendrogram is a sub-tree of the partial order of subsets on the data items. We 
conjecture that this tree will have good stability properties with respect to perturbation 
of data points. 
3.5.2 Structured clusters 
Any given cluster obtained by multi-clustering has a graph structure. When using 
normal hierarchical clustering, clusters are sub-trees. When using multi-clustering, a 
cluster has all connections, annotated with weights, so that the cluster is actually a 
weighted combinatorial graph. The graph structure changes only at edge weights of the 
graph The graph structure of the cluster changes as the cutoff moves, though all 
the structures of a given cluster are implicit in the edge weights. 
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The graph structure of a cluster may provide useful information about the cluster. If 
we were to look at the graph structure of the donut-and-ball data sets, for example, the 
diameter of the graph associated with the inner cluster would be substantially smaller 
than that associated with the outer cluster. The diameter of the graph is the longest 
path in the graph that is a shortest path between two vertices. See [22] for details. In 
any case, looking at presentations of a cluster as a graph or weighted graph could be 
informative about the cluster. 
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4 The impact of cellular representation on finite state agents 
for prisoner's dilemma 
This chapter introduces a cellular representation for finite state machines. These ma­
chines are used to play the iterated prisoner's dilemma. A ceZMor nepreaentofiofi stores 
directions for building a structure rather than directly storing the byte-level specifica­
tion for (or parameters of) the structure. Cellular representation, for artificial neural 
nets, was introduced by Frederic Gruau [10]. Cellular encodings are analogous to the 
incorporation of a form of developmental biology into the representation. Transforming 
the DNA code for an organism into the complete organism requires a complex devel­
opmental biology in nature. The cellular encoding undergoes a similar but far simpler 
process, reading a set of directions and using them to construct, in stages, the final form 
of the digital organism. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.1 we specify 
the finite state machine used together with their direct and cellular representations. In 
Section 4.2 we give the design of the experiments and specify the data collected. In 
Section 4.3 we present results. Section 4.4 presents conclusions and places the results 
in the context of an earlier study that found substantial variation in cooperation across 
other representations [1]. 
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D/C 
C/C i D/D 
C/C 
Figure 4.1 An example of a finite state machine for playing the iterated 
prisoner's dilemma. This machine is an implementation of tit-
for-two-tats that defects only if its opponent has defected on the 
last two actions. 
4.1 Direct and cellular representations 
The finite state machines used here are Mealy machines augmented with an initial 
action. These machines are described in detail in [2]. When a pair of finite state machines 
are used to play the iterated prisoner's dilemma, the initial actions are used to initiate 
play. Thereafter the two machines each use the other machine's last action as their 
current input, generating their actions from their finite state transitions. An example 
of the type of machine encoded by both the direct and cellular representations is given 
in Figure 4.1. The initial action is the label on the single sourceless arrow. Transitions 
are given by arrows and labelled with input/output pairs. 
The direct representation uses the following chromosome or data structure. It stores 
finite state machines as a pair of integer variables giving the initial action and initial 
state together with an array of states. Each state contains the four integers describing 
the next state and the corresponding responding actions for transitions out of that 
state in response to an input of defection or cooperation. The variation operators for 
the direct representation are as follows. Crossover performs a two-point crossover of 
the array of states, associating the initial state and action with the first state. The 
mutation operator changes one of the integers in the machine, replacing it with a valid 
value selected uniformly at random. This integer is the initial state or action 5% of the 
time, a transition 40% of the time, or an action 50% of the time. The usage of these 
operators and other algorithm parameters are given in the experimental design. 
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Command Effect 
D (Begin) Increment the initial action. 
(Flip) Increment the response associated with the transition for input m 
out of the current state. 
Af* (Move) Move the current state to the destination of the transition for input 
» out of the current state. 
Dm (Duplicate) Create a new state that duplicates the current state as the new 
destination of the transition for input m out of the current state. 
& (Pin) Pin the transition arrow from the current state for input n to the 
current state. It will move with the current state until another pin 
command is executed. 
A (Release) Release the pinned transition arrow, if there is one. 
in (Square) Move the transition for input n out of the current state to point to 
the state you would reach if you made two transitions associated 
with n from the current state. 
A(Ancestor) Move the current state to the state that was duplicated to create 
the current state or do not move it if the current state is the initial 
state. 
Table 4.1 Cellular rules for creating finite state machines. For IPD, m takes 
on the possible values Cooperate and Defect. Incrementing em 
action is done modulo the number of actions and so simply ex­
changes C and D. 
The cellular representation for finite state machines modifies an initial one-state 
machine with a series of editing commands, using a string of editing commands as the 
chromosome. The initial machine has an initial action the action with the smallest 
numerical index in the coding scheme (cooperation in this case). The initial machine 
returns its input as its next output, echoing the other player's actions. We call this 
machine an ecAo mocMng. For IPD, the echo machine is an encoding of the famous 
tit-for-tat strategy. 
The rules for modifying the initial echo machine into the machine encoded by the 
cellular representation are given in Table 4.1. In order to execute these rules it is 
necessary to use structures not in the final finite state machines. The first of these 
structures is a pointer to a cumenf a&zZe. This pointer is initialized to point to the 
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echo machine's sole state. This pointer may be moved, it may drag a transition arrow 
with it by using the pin commands, and also serves as a sort of "editing head" that 
says where rules that modify the machine will be applied. The second structure beyond 
the nominal finite state machine is a collection of pointers connecting each state in the 
machine to the state that was duplicated to create it. These pointers are used to execute 
the A(Ancestor) command. 
Notice that only two of the thirteen rules, Dc and Dp, generate a new state. This 
means the number of states in a machine is equal to the number of D* rules in the 
cellular encoding plus one. 
Let's look at the results of starting with Echo (Tit-for-Tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma) 
and applying the following sequence of editing commands: Af%, fb, fi, fb, or, if we 
issue the commands using the inputs and outputs of the Prisoner's Dilemma: Do, Afo, 
fb, fb, fc- The current state is denoted by a double circle on the state. 
Tit-for-Tat is the starting point. 
D/D 









pins the C-transition from the current state to the current state. 
C/C c/c D/D 
D/D 
increments the response on the D-transition from the current state. 
C/C D/D C/C 
D/C 
fc increments the response on the C-transition from the current state. 
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C/D C/C D/D 
D/C 
So this sequence of editing commands transforms our starting machine Tit-for-Tat 
into a version of Pavlov. 
The variation operators for the cellular representation are quite simple. The crossover 
is two point crossover of the string of editing rules. Mutation consists of choosing a 
position in the string of editing rules uniformly at random and replacing the character 
at that position with a new one selected uniformly at random. Details of how these 
operators are applied are given in the section on experimental design. 
4.1.1 Completeness 
The baseline among the experiments presented here are those using the direct repre­
sentation. Here we demonstrate that the machine that can be represented by the direct 
representation can all be found in the cellular representation. 
Definition 4.1.1. .AcceaaiMe atotea in a /inite atote machine ore the states thot con 6e 
reached /rum (he initio/ atote. 
The behavior of a finite state machine only depends on its accessible states. We 
don't have to consider the inaccessible states when we prove the cellular representation 
is complete. 
Definition 4.1.2. The depth o/ the atote i is the number orca in the a/iortest pot/% /rem 
the initio! state 1 to the atote i. /t is denoted oa depth(i). A depth o/ o /inite atote 
mochine ia TnoiimifTn of oM depths q/ atotea o/ G ond ia denoted oa depth(O). 
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Notice that a state with depth t cannot have an incoming arc from a state with 
depth less than t — 1, for otherwise its depth would be less than & and this contradicts 
the fact that its depth is t. Therefore a state with depth & can have an incoming arc 
only from a state with depth t — 1. For the same reason, a state with depth t cannot 
have an outgoing arc to a state with depth more than t +1. 
Theorem 4.1.3. /mite stote machine ^ignoring states inaccessiMe /rum the initial 
stated can 6e speci/ied the ceZWar ruZes in 7h6Ze ^ J. /n other words, the given ceZMar 
representation in TbMe is complete. 
froo/i We need only to consider making states and changing transition arrows becuase 
we can set the responses using when the state is created. 
Let y be a set of states and f a set of transitions of a finite machine. Then a Suite 
state machine can be considered as a digraph G with a set of vertices y and a set of arcs 
It is enough to show that a digraph G can be specified by the cellular rules, which 
can be proved by mathematical induction on the depth of a finite state machine G. 
If the depth of a finite state machine is 0, G has only one state, which is the initial 
state. Just change its action using as appropriate, and we are done. 
Suppose the result holds when the depth of a finite state machine is less than t. 
Consider the case that the depth of a finite state machine is t. Let be the set of 
states whose depth are t—1 and the set of states whose depths are &. Delete all states 
in V& from G and change the incoming arcs to to loops, i.e., let G'=G-V%+{(i,i)| (ij) 
is arc of G such that i in and j in %}. Clearly, each state of G' has two outgoing 
arcs and is connected from the initial state; hence it is a finite state machine. Because 
of the way that it is constructed, its depth is & — 1. Thus it is specified using the cellular 
encoding rules by the induction hypothesis. For each outgoing arc (i, j) from to V& 
in G, there is a loop (i, i) in G'. Create the state j which duplicates the state i of G' 
and move the current state from i to j. Then we have an arc (i, j). Pin and releaae its 
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two transitions then it become an echo machine. 
If the state j has a transition which reaches to any state A in y — then pin that 
transition of the current state j. Move the current state form j to i using A as needed. 
The rule A allows the current state in anywhere to return to the initial state 1 and the 
rule M* allows the current state to move from the initial state to any state. In other 
words, the editing pointer can get from the current state to every other state. It is 
possible to make states inaccessible from the initial state but they are not part of the 
finite state machine and so we may ignore them. In other words, the editing focus can 
point from the current state to every other state using A and Mm- Thus we can move 
the current state from the state j to the state A. If we release the pinned transition 
arrow then we have an arc (j, A). If the state j has a transition which reaches a state Z in 
and Z is not yet created, then leave that transition as a loop (j, j). Move the current 
state to the state Z' in which is connected to Z. Create the state Z in the same way 
that we created the state j. Move the current state from Z to j using and M*. Now, 
we have state Z. Pin the loop (j, j) and move the current state from j to Z then we will 
have an arc (j, Z). If Z is already created then omit the process for creating and do the 
same process as above. 
If another state # in has an outgoing arc to the state j in the component, it should 
correspond to a loop (<y, (?) in C. Thus move the current state to g and pin to that loop 
and move the current state back to j using A and Af*. 
If there are more states in depth t that should be created, then move the current 
state to a state of depth & — 1, which has an arc to them using and A; repeat the 
same process as above until we create all states and arcs. Therefore the finite state 
machine G is specified by the cellular rules. O 
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4.2 Experimental design 
The experimental design follows that of [2] and [14] in many details; this will facilitate 
comparison across experiments. The experiment here extends the experiment presented 
in [1]. Two sets of 400 evolutionary simulations were performed, one for the direct 
representation and one for the cellular representation. Each simulation was run for 
250 generations with a population of 36 IPD agents. To evaluate fitness a round robin 
tournament in which each pair of agents play 150 rounds of IPD was used. Fitness was 
normalized to average payoff per play for reporting purposes. 
The model of evolution used is a generational evolutionary algorithm with a two-
thirds elite. In each generation the most fit two-thirds of the population was copied 
into the next generation. These are the eKfe. In sorting the population to find the elite 
ties are broken uniformly at random. The remaining one-third of the new population 
was generated as follows. Pairs of distinct parents were selected with replacement by 
roulette selection from the elite. These parents were copied, the copies subjected to 
crossover, and a single mutation applied to each result of the crossover to generate pairs 
of members of the new population. 
The machines used in the direct representation have 16 states to be consistent with 
previous experiments[l, 2, 14]. The values for initial states, actions, and all outputs 
and transitions were initialized by filling in valid values chosen uniformly at random. In 
order to make the machines as similar as possible across the two representations, the 
length of the cellular representation was chosen to be 98 editing commands. Two of 
the thirteen commands create a new state and so, on average, executing 97.5 editing 
commands will yield a 16 state machine. As we will see in the discussion section, this 
normalization is probably not important. 
The statistics tracked during evolution were the population mean, standard devia­
tion, and maximum of both fitness and age for each evolutionary simulation performed. 
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The age of an machine is initially zero and is incremented each time the machine is 
copied into a new generation as part of the elite. The age of machines can be used to 
track succession. When a new type arises and takes over an ecology, the maximum and 
average ages drop. 
4.3 Results 
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Figure 4.2 The 95% confidence intervals, computed over 400 populations, 
for the population mean fitness in generations 1-250. 
It was found that the direct and cellular representations produce statistically signifi­
cant differences in the level of cooperation. Figure 4.2 shows a plot of the 95% confidence 
interval, for the population mean fitness computer over all 400 evolutionary simulations 
run for the two representations. While both exhibit the standard dip-and-rise, the cel­
lular representation moves to its long-term average value far faster. 
In [1] the probabilities that a given representation would be cooperative or at least 
achieve a better score than a random player Hipping a fair coin to choose its move were 
computed. A population is deemed cooperative if its population mean score per game 
played is at least 2.8. The reasoning used to select this cutoff is given in [1]. Briefly, a 
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Figure 4.3 The 95% conûdence intervals on the probability a given repre­
sentation will be cooperative in generation 250. 
sixteen state machine cannot engage in sustained defection as part of its cyclic behavior 
and achieve a score above 2.8 when fitness is evaluated with 150 rounds of play. A 95% 
confidence interval was computed for the probability of cooperative and better-than-
random play for eight representations: directly represented finite state machines with 
16 states, boolean logic trees coded with genetic programming, a Markov chain repre­
sentation, a lookup table, an alternative genetic programming structure called an ISAc 
list, boolean logic trees augmented with a time delay operation, and two types of arti­
ficial neural net, one with a bias toward cooperation. In the Neural net representation, 
neurons had a activation threshold of 0. For the second, termed the Cooperative neural 
net representation, the neurons had a threshold of 0.5, creating a 3:1 bias in favor of 
cooperation at the level of individual neurons. Details of these representations are given 
in [1]. 
The confidence intervals on cooperative and better-than-random play were computed 
for 100 evolution runs for all representations ezcepfthe direct and cellular representations 
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Figure 4.4 The 95% conûdence intervals on the probability a given repre­
sentation will score better than random in generation 250. 
chapter were used. Because of this, the confidence interval is roughly half as wide for 
these two representations. The confidence intervals for all nine representations are shown 
in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. 
The direct and cellular representations exhibit a significant difference for both prob­
ability of cooperation and probability of better-than-random play. Compared with the 
other representations, the Cellular representation exhibits an intermediate level of coop-
erativeness and roughly a 75% chance of playing better than random. By considering the 
confidence intervals for better-than-random play we can see that the cellular represen­
tation has behavior significantly different from all the other representations presented. 
4.4 Conclusions and discussion 
This chapter tests a cellular representation for finite state machines in the context 
of evolving agents to play the iterated prisoner's dilemma. Three measures of per­
formance, mean population score, probability of cooperative play, and probability of 
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better-than-random play all clearly separate the cellular representation from the direct 
representation. These performance measures are neither independent nor completely 
dependent on one another. They all speak to the question "is cooperation emerging in 
this system?" 
Comparison with a previous study of eight relatively simple representations showed 
that the cellular representation was in the middle of the pack from the perspective of 
agents evolving to a state of cooperative play. The more cellular representation, which 
was more complicated from an implementation perspective, was both different from 
its own direct representation and roughly as cooperative as two other representations. 
These representations were both forms of genetic programming using parse trees with 
Boolean operators. 
The experiments demonstrate that completeness of representation, proved for the 
cellular encoding in Section 4.1.1, does not tell the entire story. Likewise the equivalences 
proved in Section 2.4 do not yield equivalent results under evolution. Changing the 
representation modifies the distribution of initial strategies and the shape of the fitness 
landscape. For the system studied here these impacts were significant. 
The complexity of a strategy coded by a finite state machine can be estimated by 
the number of states in the machine. For the direct representation this is exactly 
sixteen states. For the cellular representation, the initial population starts with a 
shifted binomial distribution of numbers of states with n = 98 and p = & a 
shift caused by starting with one state in the initial machine. This yields a mean of 
98 x ^ 4-1 = 16.08. The standard deviation of the number of states in the cellular 
representation is x p x (1 — p) = 3.57. The experimental design intentionally made 
the mean number of states in the cellular machine as close as possible to the value for 
the direct representation. 
The number of states, however, is a weak measure of complexity. When a represen­
tation does not need to use all of its data then some of the space may be filled in with 
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Figure 4.5 Counts of the number of machines with a given number of states 
accessible from the initial state. This plot is for a sample of 
100,000 randomly generated machine for each of the two repre­
sentations. 
junk. This junk space can be used to manage the disruption of the variation operators 
and to store things that may be useful after being revealed by a fortuitous crossover. In a 
finite state machine, states that cannot be reached from the initial state are one possible 
type of junk. Figure 4.5 shows the distribution of the number of states accessible from 
the initial state in 100,000 randomly generated machines for both the direct and cellular 
representation. The distributions are almost mirror images with the cellular represen­
tation favoring enormously less complex initial machines. The computations used to 
generate Figure 4.5 were performed again on the 400 final populations of 36 machines. 
This yields 14,400 rather than 100,000 samples. The resulting distribution of numbers 
of states of shown in Figure 4.6. 
Comparison of Figure 4.5 and 4.6 suggests that the cellular representation locates 
simpler machines than the direct representation. Aside from weeding out machines with 
a very email number of accessible states from the cellular populations, there seems to 
be little change in the distribution, given the smaller size of the evolved samples. 
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Figure 4.6 Counts of the number of machines with a given number of states 
accessible from the initial state. This plot is for generations 250 
of the experimental runs for each representation. 
Prior to performing the research I thought that the cellular representation would lead 
to machines with a reasonably large number of accessible states. Each state is accessible, 
when created by a duplicate operation, from the state it duplicates. The pin operation 
permits the breaking of these ties and apparently has a larger impact than expected. 
There are other measures of complexity than "states accessible from the initial state" 
for a finite state machine. If two states produce exactly the same responses for all possible 
input strings, then those states are eguiWent and the machine can be simplified by 
identifying those states. The simplification does not change the strategy encoded by 
the finite state machines, it just reduces the number of states required to implement it. 
Checking all input strings of a given length 2" — 1 suffices to document equivalence of 
states because a finite state machine must fall into a cycle for strings of inputs exceeding 
that length (in fact, far more efficient algorithms are possible, but that is beyond the 
scope of this chapter). The finite state machines obtained for both the standard and 
cellular representations were first reduced by throwing out all states not accessible from 
the initial state and then reduced by identifying all sets of equivalent states. Table 4.2 
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Count of machines with a given number of s 
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gives a 95% confidence interval for the mean number of states in these doubly reduced 







Standard 10.75 (10.69,10.81) 
Cellular 3.54 (3.51,3.57) 
Table 4.2 Mean machine sizes for both representations after reduction of 
inaccessible and inequivalent states. 
This last quantization of the machines complexity computed for each representation 
demonstrates that the two representations are sampling the strategy space in substan­
tially different ways. 
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5 Techniques for analysis of evolved prisoner's dilemma 
strategies with fingerprints. 
It is easy to generate strategies for games such as the iterated prisoner's dilemma us­
ing evolutionary computation, but much harder to analyze those strategies. In Chapter 
2, we introduced Fingerprints are a functional signature of game playing 
agents that captures essential features of an agent's strategy while ignoring implemen­
tation details. 
Digital evolution often produces representational obfuscation. Two agents playing 
the same strategy can look very different. An agent that plays a relatively simple strategy 
can have a complex representation of that strategy. An example of this type of evolved 
obfuscation is shown in Figure 5.1. The fingerprint function of this strategy is precisely 
(z + 
where A, T, P, and Q are the payoffs for Prisoner's dilemma from Figure 1.1. This 
function is the fingerprint of Tit-For-Tat. The agent's strategy is Tit-For-Tat augmented 
by six essentially transient states. 
One of the results concerning fingerprints proved in Chapter 2 is that the fingerprint 
of a strategy containing a single communicating class in its Markov chain is exactly 
the fingerprint of that communicating class. This means that transient states in such a 
strategy can be ignored in the computation of the fingerprint. 
Using functional fingerprints, it is practical to cluster agents and to rapidly identify 
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c/c D/D D/D C/D 
Figure 5.1 The machine above is an evolved machine that has the same 
fingerprint as Tit-for-tat. When playing against itself it makes 
five moves to reach state five, which encodes Tit-for-tat. The 
machine also ends up playing Tit-for-tat against a wide variety 
of opponents. States zero and one are entirely transient. If the 
machine ever reaches state 2 or 4 it cannot return to states 3 
and 6, which themselves generate Tit-for-tat moves. In states 2 
and 4 the machine makes provocative moves until the opponent 
defects in state two. At this point the machine "apologizes" and 
moves to state five. State five, which plays Tit-for-tat, is the 
sole attractor of the entire finite state diagram. 
common agent types in spite of the representational obfuscation often generated by 
evolutionary training techniques. In this chapter, a set of 1080 agents from 30 evolved 
populations are subjected to analysis using fingerprint based techniques. is 
used to remove, first, well known and then later common strategies. A novel clustering 
technique, multi-clustering, is then used to cluster the remaining strategies. 
5.1 Known fingerprints 
Here we catalog strategies for which exact fingerprints have been computed. These 
fingerprints will be used for filtration of these well-known strategies. Always defect 
(ADD), always cooperate (AUG), Tit-For-tat (TFT), Psycho (PSY), Pavlov (PAV), Tit-
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Figure 5.2 A minimal Suite state representation of punish once. 
For-Two-Tats (TF2T), and Two-Tïts-For-Tat (TTFT) were deûned in 2.1 in Chapter 
2. Punish once (Puni) defects initially. Its next move is cooperation. After that it 
cooperates in response to cooperation. If its opponent defects, it returns one defection 
and then follows that defection by a cooperation no matter what the opponent does. A 
representation of Puni is shown in Figure 5.2. The fingerprints given here are relative 
to the scores given in Figure 1.1. 
frfrMMD, %,%/) = 4z +1 (5.1.1) 
frrr(AMC, z, %/) = 3(1 - %/) (5.1.2) 
frfr(TFr,z,y) = + 5%%/ + 3a;2 (z + 3/)^ (5.1.3) 
frfT(P5Y,z,!/) = 4(%/ - l)(z - 1) + 5(y - 1)2 (5.1.4) 2(z - !)(%/ - 1) + (z - l)^ 4- (y - l)^ 
3z + 5^ — 4y2 
z + 2%/ 
(5.1.5) 
Ay, z,y) = 3z(z — 1) + %/(z - 1) + 5%/(%/ - 1) 
2%/(z - 1) + z(z - 1) 4- %/(%/ — 1) (5.1.6) 
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frrr(T F2T, z, y) = 4- -{- 3z 4-
4.2zy^ 4- z 4-
(5.1.7) 
frfr(TTFT,z,%/) = 3r^ 4- 5%2%/ 4- 4z%/ 4- a%/  ^ 4- y 
4- 2a^y 4- 4-zy^ 4- y 
(5.1.8) 
5.2 Data acquisition and analysis 
A collection of 30 populations of finite state machines were trained to play the it­
erated prisoner's dilemma with an evolutionary algorithm. The machines were Mealy 
machines with sixteen states. Populations of 36 machines were used, evaluating fitness 
with a round-robin tournament of 150 plays. An elite of 24 machines participated in 
reproduction. Machines were selected in distinct pairs by roulette selection. Selected 
machines were copied over members of the twelve machines being replaced. The states 
of each copy were treated as a linear chromosome used to perform two point crossover. 
A single mutation was performed on each copy that modified the initial state of the 
machine 5% of the time, the initial action 5% of the time, the destination of a state 
transition 40% of the time, and the response to an opponent's action 50% of the time. 
Evolution was run for 250 generations for each population. The 1080 machines in the 30 
Anal populations were used for analysis. The machines were first reduced by removing 
states that can not be reached from the initial state. Two states are equivalent if their 
responses, as starting states, to all possible inputs are identical. Standard techniques 
[9] were used to locate and identify classes of equivalent states. The resulting machines 
were used for analysis. 
is a simple technique for removing strategies with fingerprints similar to a 
known reference strategy. The fingerprints of all machines under analysis, including the 
reference strategy, are computed on a finite grid of n sample points in the unit square. 
The value of the fingerprint on those n points is treated as a point in R" and those within 
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a fixed Euclidean distance of the reference strategy are filtered out of the data set and 
declared similar to it. Sampling of estimated fingerprint values is performed by playing 
the agent being sampled against %, y) at each sample point. Play continues, 
resetting both the machine being sampled and Tit-for-tat to their initial actions every 
150 steps, until at least 1000 plays are made and the width of a 95% confidence interval 
on the value of the fingerprint is at most 0.01. Filtration was performed in two stages 
nming the set of sample points 
# = {(z, y) : z, y € {i/6 : * = 1,2,..., 5}} 










Table 5.1 Counts for well known strategies located via filtration in the 1080 
machine sample. 
First, strategies similar to always defect, always cooperate, Tit-for-tat, Psycho, 
Pavlov, Tit-for-two-tats, Two-tits-for-tat, and Punish Once were filtered using the closed 
form of the fingerprint for these strategies. Sampled fingerprints within a distance of 
d = 0.2 of the reference fingerprint were declared similar to it. This distance thresh­
old was chosen experimentally; when this threshold was used on the 1080 finite state 
machines, all distances less than 0.2 were actually close to 0.024 suggesting that the 
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entire distance to the reference strategy could be due to sampling error in estimating 
the fingerprints on the sample points. 
For the machines remaining after filtration, the number of fingerprints within Eu­
clidean distance 0.2, subsequently called neighbors, of each strategy were computed. The 
machine with the most neighbors was chosen and filtration performed for that strategy. 
This neighbor-based filtration was continued iteratively until the number of neighbors 
dropped below 10. This procedure resulted in 17 clusters. Examples of the fingerprints 
of two of these clusters are shown in Figure 5.3. All the clusters found via neighbor 
filtration had the same compactness (small distance to the reference strategy) that the 
clusters obtained by filtering for known strategies had. The largest neighbor filtration 
cluster had 38 members, the smallest 11. After neighbor filtration, 543 strategies had 
been assigned to clusters of similar strategies, leaving 537 machines unclassified. 
Filtration yields clusters that are essentially globes of points. The points are those 
in the data set that are within a fixed radius of the reference strategy. 
Multi %-means clustering was used on the 537 strategies remaining after filtration. 
The resulting groupings of fingerprints are shown in Figure 5.4, organized into clusters in 
reading order. The clustering locates 21 clusters similar to those produced by filtration, 
though less compact. It also produces one enormous cluster, the Erst, which contains a 
substantial diversity of strategies. This cluster appears to share certain characteristics 
with the clusters in the synthetic data shown in Figure 3.8. The strategies in that cluster 
are not similar at all, but it is possible to End chaîna of strategies A similar to B, B 
similar to C, and so on, that transitively join the strategies in the cluster. A more 
complete examination of this cluster appears in the discussion section. 
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Neighbor cluster 6 
Neighbor cluster 9 
Figure 5.3 Sampled fingerprints for two of the machinelike clusters. The 
simplest machine in both clusters has 10 states in its reduced 
form. 
5.3 Discussion and conclusions 
Filtration is a less sophisticated technique than if-means clustering or multi-clustering 
and its use needs some justification. In this Chapter, filtration was a better choice for 
the initial analysis for two reasons. First, the more sophisticated clustering methods do 
not contain special knowledge about known strategies like Tit-for-tat. While the finger­
prints of such strategies could be inserted as initial cluster centers in ff-means, either 
on their own or as part of multi-clustering, those cluster centers need not be retained. 
91 
L W k  
AL.**; 
Figure 5.4 Clustering of the 537 strategies remaining after filtration. The 
fingerprints are arranged in reading order and blank squares sep­
arate clusters. The first, very large, cluster is an example of a 
non-compact cluster in which pairs of strategies are close in a 
manner that binds the cluster together transitively. The remain­
ing 21 clusters are all relatively compact. Multi-clustering was 
performed with D uniformly in the range 200-250 "Ring 10,000 
AT-means clusterings. 
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Second, the simple known strategies that appeared among the evolved machines were 
arranged in very tight groupings in fingerprint space, permitting their clean excision 
from the remainder of the data set via filtration. Removing these strategies also reduced 
the size of the data set. 
Multi-clustering located 21 clusters that, to visual inspection of their fingerprints, 
are made of a single strategy type. It also located an enormous cluster with complex 
internal structure. Since a cluster produced by multi-clustering is extracted from a 
weighted graph, the cluster itself possesses the structure of a combinatorial graph. Pre­
viously it was asserted that the Erst, large cluster was like the clusters in the synthetic 
data, containing points quite distant from one another but joined by chaîna of pairwise 
similarity. 
In order to test this assertion, the graph structure of the large cluster was extracted 
and the graph laid out by distance from one of its most eccentric vertices. The eccen&ic-
% of a vertex is the largest distance from a vertex to any other in the graph using the 
standard path-length notion of distance for graphs [22]. This layout is shown in Figure 
5.5. The vertex used as the starting point for the layout appears at the bottom of the 
picture. The vertices are arranged in levels above this vertex with the next level above 
the bottom vertex being its neighbors in the graph, the next level above that being 
their neighbors, and so on. A ctd wertec is a vertex that would disconnect the graph if 
removed. Note that in this depiction, this graph has seven visible cut vertices visible. 
The graph layout shown in Figure 5.5 is one of several possibilities. We could, for 
example, re- order horizontally the vertices within each distance class from the bottom to 
reduce the number of edge crossings. Nevertheless, this layout shows that the cluster has 
several points where the deletion of a single vertex would break the cluster into smaller, 
and far more compact, clusters. This suggests that development of tools for manipulating 
the graphical structure of clusters found with multi-clustering is a worthwhile endeavor. 
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Figure 5.5 The graphical structure of the large cluster located by multi-
clustering, laid out vertically try distance from one of the most 
eccentric vertices in the graph. The eccentric vertex selected is 
at the bottom of the layout. The diameter of the graph (number 
of levels in this drawing) is 48. 
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Communicating 
Classes Random Evolved 
1 946 1080 
2 118 0 
3 13 0 
4 2 0 
5 1 0 
Table 5.2 Tabulation of the number of communicating classes in the finger­
print Markov chains of 1080 random 16-state machines reduced 
in the same manner as the evolved machines compared with the 
number of communicating classes in the 1080 evolved machines. 
5.4 Number of communicating classes 
The computation of fingerprints becomes more complex when the Markov chain has 
multiple communicating classes. When first investigating the large cluster produced 
by multi-clustering, it was conjectured that the polynomial weighted sum fingerprints 
of machines with multiple communicating classes was helping to create the extended 
cluster, providing fingerprints that bridged other classes. The number of communicating 
classes of each of the machines in that cluster was computed. The results were startling. 
This led to the computations summarized in Table 5.2. Random machines strongly favor 
a small number of communicating classes. All 1080 evolved machines in the data set 
used in this chapter had only one communicating class. This suggests a very strong 
preference for having a single communicating class. 
The possession of a single communicating class in all evolved machines seems even 
stranger when machines like the one in Figure 5.1 are considered. One possible expla­
nation for the existence of a single communicating class is that the evolved machines 
use relatively few states, favoring simplicity. The machine in Figure 5.1 uses a simple 
communicating class (with one state), but it uses six other states to lead into it. There 
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are a number of easy ways for mutation to add a communicating class to this machine, 
e.g., snap the transition from state 4 to 2 and have it loop from 4 to 4. 
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6 Conclusion and future directions 
The double fingerprint on the unit square is useful for characterizing and visualizing 
the behavior of a game playing agent. Although this thesis developed both the theory and 
application only for finite state machines trained by evolutionary computation to play 
the iterated prisoner's dilemma, the technique is more general. Specially, visualization 
is possible in the manner shown in Chapter 2 for any game with two moves and the 
Markov chain computations and fingerprint functions exist for games with more than 
two moves. However, this simple two-dimensional visualization does not exist for games 
with more then two moves because the number of independent dimensions grows with 
the number of moves. 
Closed form fingerprint functions are computable for any game playing agent for a 
two player game that can be implemented as a finite state machine. Sampling techniques 
can be used to obtain approximate fingerprints for agent representations other than finite 
state machines. An example of a strategy that cannot be implemented with a finite state 
machine is the Mqyor% strategy. The Majority has an almost everywhere continuous 
fingerprint which can be found algebraically. Since fingerprints are indifferent to the 
agent's representation, they permit a cross-representation comparison of the similarity 
of strategies. There may well be closed form representations possible for non finite state 
machines. 
All fingerprints shown in this thesis are the T# — /or — fingerprint, that is to 
say they are all 
fra-for-Tof (.4, %,%/)-
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This was done because the amount of computation required to extract a fingerprint grows 
sharply with the total number of states in the two finite state machines involved, and 
Tit—For—Tat is a one-state machine. Fingerprints for other Gngerprinting functions will 
capture other information about a strategy and so may be useful for both visualization 
and automatic analysis. The simple metric used in this thesis for clustering of strategies 
was based on sampling the fingerprint at various points and taking the square root of the 
sum of squared differences. This distance measure permits the clustering of strategies 
and could be used for the derivation of hierarchical behavioral relationships. 
Using functional fingerprints, it is practical to cluster agents and to rapidly iden­
tify common agent types in spite of the representational obfuscation often generated 
by evolutionary training techniques. To cluster functional fingerprints, we developed 
a new clustering technique which we called, multi-clustering. Using multi-clustering 
we successfully discovered the designed cluster structure of all the synthetic data sets 
used with a minimum of parameter tuning. In Chapter 5, a set of 1080 agents from 
30 evolved populations were subjected to analysis using fingerprint based techniques. 
Fdtmtionwas used to remove Erst well known and then subsequently common strate­
gies. Multi-clustering was then used to cluster the remaining strategies. The use of 
aggregate filtration and multi-clustering makes analysis of evolved agents substantially 
easier. Agents playing known strategies were quickly identified and removed from the 
agent pool and unknown types were clustered into plausible groupings. Because a clus­
ter produced by multi-clustering is extracted from a weighted graph, the cluster itself 
possesses the structure of a combinatorial graph. The graph structure of a large cluster 
can be extracted and the graph laid out distance from one of its most eccentric vertices. 
In this way we could see what tendencies the cluster has. The unsuspected tendency 
of evolution to prefer finite state strategies composed of a single communicating class 
was documented. Our tentative explanation for the phenomenon is that machines with 
a single communicating class are more behaviorally robust during reproduction. Given 
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the small size of the populations being used, the Glial populations are typically variations 
on a single dominant type. Changing behavior is likely to be deadly. A form of meta-
selection for robustness against mutation was found to be plausible in this environment. 
We noted the importance of a communicating class: once entered, the communicating 
class captures all subsequent play. A machine with two communicating classes would 
have two distinct long term behaviors. Mutation in the network of states leading to 
the communicating class can thus result in a large change in the machine's behavior. 
A mutation joining the two communicating classes or opening a leak from one to the 
other would likewise create a large change in behavior. This explanation can be tested 
experimentally by tracing the number of communicating classes during evolution and 
will be the target of future experiments. 
The cellular representation introduced in Chapter 4 is one of many possible cellular 
representations. New editing operations could be added, old ones deleted, or the rate of 
use of editing operations could be changed. Reducing or eliminating the pm operations, 
for example, might remove the potentially confounding problem with the automata 
having few accessible states. This is part of an ongoing project to catalog representations 
and understand their impact on the iterated prisoner's dilemma and other games. The 
goal of modeling behavior for use in everything from virtual ecology to digital focus 
groups waits on an understanding of how representation impacts system behavior. Only 
after substantial progress has been made in this area can we make agents that behave in 
a manner usefully similar to the animals and people we wish to model. As the project 
continues, Figures 4.3 and 4.4 will continue to grow and will be generalized to other 
games. An important next step is apply filtration and multi-clustering to the analysis 
of evolved finite state machine strategies stored in cellular encoding structures using 
functional fingerprints and to compare the results with the result in Chapter 5. 
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APPENDIX I : Catalog of selected fingerprints of IPD playing 
strategies 
1. AUG The AUG strategy always plays C. 
fra-For-T<a (./UZC) = S'y + _R(1 — %/) 
fra-for-Tat(^ZC) = 3(1 — y) 
2. A11D The AUD strategy always plays D. 
Fra-for-Tof ( AZZD) = 4a; +1 
Fra-for-Taf (/MZD) = f (1 — z) 4- Tz 
3. Alternate The strategy Alternate chooses C as its initial action and then alter­
nate it actions. 
FTa-F^Tat(Atternate,x,y) - ^  + 5(l-%)+T(l-») + fy 
Fra-for-T<d(^<emate, z, y) = —— 
4. Tit-fbr-Tat The strategy Tit-for-lkt plays C as its initial action and then repeats 
100 
the other player's last action. 
fra_ror-rai(T# - For - Tat, z, %/) = 4- (T 4- 4-(z + %/) 2 
Fra-ror-r^ (Tit - For - Tat, z, y) = 2/^ -t- 5zy + 3z% (z + 
5. Psycho The strategy Psycho chooses D as its initial action and then plays the 
opposite of its opponent's last action. 
Fr*_f«--Ta* (PsycAo, T, %/) 
P(1 - %/)(! - z) + g(l - z)= + T(1 - %/)2 + A(1 - %/)(! - z)) 
(2(1 - z)(l -%/) + (!- z)^ + (1 - 2/)^) 
6. Pavlov The strategy Pavlov plays C as its initial action and cooperates thereafter 
if its action and its opponent's actions matched last time. 
Fra_fm._:roi(Pawfou, %, %/) 
7. Tit-For-Two-Tats The strategy Tit-For-Two-Tats chooses C as its initial action 
and then defects only if its opponent has defected on the last two actions. 
Fr*-For-r<d(T# - For - Two — Tats, z, %/) 
_ 5"(zi/ 4- zy) 4- A(z(l — 2/)^ 4- 4- zi/(l — %/)) + Tzy^ + 
z^y + 2z%/^ 4- z 4- 2/^ 
FTit-For-Tat(PSycho, Z, t/) — 4(y - l)(z - 1) + 5(%/ — 1)^ 2(z - l)(y - 1) + (z - 1)2 + (%/ - 1)2 
5"%/(z — 1) 4- Az(z — 1) 4- Py(z — 1) -I- T%/(%/ — 1) 
2y(z - 1) 4- z(z - 1) -t- 2/(2/ - 1) 
Fr«*-for-Ta* (Fat;Zo«, z, %/) 3z(z - 1) + %/(z -1)4- 63/(2/ - 1) 2%/(z -1)4- z(z — 1) 4- %/(%/ - 1) 
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8. Two-Tit-For-Tat The strategy Two-Tits-For-Tat chooses C as its initial action 
and then defects twice if its opponent has defected on the last actions. 
fra_for_7w(Two - Tita - For - Tot, z, y) 
= /rocAr^ + T(yaf + zy) + f(y(l - z)^ + %/z + zy(l - %)) + + 2a^y + + ?/ 
- r,„„ . 
9. Punish once The strategy Punish once (Puni) defects initially. Its next move is 
cooperation. After that if cooperates in response to cooperation. If its opponent defects, 
it returns one defection and then follows that defection by a cooperation no matter what 
the opponent does.chooees D as its initial action and then defects once at the moment 
when opponent starts defecting. 
Pun 1 
Initial response:!) 
Initial state :1 
State If C If D 
1 C - + 2  C - ^ 2  
2 C —• 2 1 
fra-r.r_T.i(Punl, %) = + ?(%/ %f) + V 
fra-for-ro*(f«ml, z, y) = 
z + 2y 
3z + 5y — 
z + 2y 
10. Dual of Punish Once The strategy, Dual of Punish Once cooperates initially. 
Its next move is defection. After that if defects in response to cooperation. If its 
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opponent defects, it returns one cooperation and then follows that cooperation by a 
defection no matter what the opponent does. 
Dual of Punish once 
Initial response:C 
Initial state :1 
State If C If D 
1 Z) —^ 2 D —> 2 
2 D - » 2  C - ^ l  
^a-for-T*t(Dual of Punish once, z, y) = ^ ^ ^ 
fra-for-ro*(Dual of Punish once, z, y) = 
2 - 2z 4- y 
-3af + 2z + 5y + 1 
2 — 2x + y 
11 
Initial response:Z)orC 
Initial state :1 
State If C If D 
1 D - ^ 2  D - + 1  
2 C - ^ 2  1 
Fra-for-raf(ll, 2, y) = Az^ + S"z^y + T(zy + afy) + f (zy^ - zy -i- y) 
fr«t-for-rot(ll, z, y) 
z^ + 2z^y + zy^ + y 
3af -I- 5z^y + zy^ + 4zy + y 




Initial stat e :1 
State If C If D 
1 D —» 2 1 
2 C - ^  1  D - ^ 2  
Ftu—Foi—Tot (12, x, y) + S(z — T(2% — z^) + P(%2 — 2% 4- %/ + 1) 
f r a -for-Tmf(12,Z, y) = 
z + y + 1 
-z^ 4- 8z 4- y 4-1 
z 4 - y 4 - 1  
13 
Initial response:C 
Initial state :1 
State I f C  If D 
1 C - > 2  C - ^ 2  
2 C - ^  1  D -+ 1 
fra-for-Tot(13, Z, y) 
fr«*-for-r«a(13, z, y) 
6z — 3zy + 5%/ — 4y^ 
2z 4- 2y 
A(2z - zy) 4- 5"(zy 4- y) 4- T(y - y^) + 
2z 4- 2y 
14 
Init ial respoi ise:D 
Initié state :1 
State I f C  If D 
1 D - + 2  D - » 2  
2 C - ^  1  Z) —^ 2 
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^Ta-for-Tot (14, z, %/) = Rzy 4- S(y — zy) + Tz + P%/ 
fra-for-Tof (14, z, y) = 
a + 2%/ 
3zy 4- 5z 4- %/ 
z 4- 2%/ 
15 
Initial response: C 
Initial state :1 
State I f C  If D 
1 C —• 2 C - ^ 2  
2 D -» 1 C —> 1 
Fra-For-Tof(15, z, y) 
_ 3A(2 - z - 2%/ 4- z%/) 4- g(%/ - z%/ - z 4-1) 4- T(1 - i/)^ 4- f (y - y') 
4 — 2z — 2y 
fra-for-Toi(15, z, y) 3y2 — 16%/ 4- 4z%/ — 4z 4-12 4 — 2z — 2%/ 
16 
Initial response: D 
Initial state :1 
State I f C  If D 
1 D 2 C  — > 2  
2 1 C - »  1  
^ra-.For-r<a(16, z, %/) 
_ A(z — z^) 4- S(z^ — 2z 4-1) 4- T(z — zy — %/ 4-1) 4- f (2 — 2z — %/ 4- z%/)) 
4 — 2z — 2y 
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fr#-For-Tot(l6, Z, 3/) -3af 6z — 4z%/ 
17 
Initial response: D 
Initial state :1 
State I f C  If D 
1 D - » 2  D 2 
2 C —» 1 D —> 2 
. . + j>(a;-af) + T(zy 4-z) + f(2z - zy) 
fra-for-Tof (17, z, y) = 
Ft it—For—Tat (17, X, y) 
2z + 2y 
3af + 4a%/ + 5z + y 
2z + 2y 
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APPENDIX II : Examples of machine computations 
If a finite state machine has more than three states, then it is not easy to find its 
fingerprint function by hands. The average number of states that evolved finite states 
machines have is 13. We developed the software that gives linear equations to calculate 
its fingerprint for an input finite state machine. The following examples are finite states 
machines and linear equations for finding their fingerprints. 
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example 1 
States: 13. Start: D —» 0 
I f C  If D 
0) C - + 0  1 
1) C —» 2 D - ^ 3  
2) C —> 1 C —> 4 
3) (7 —» 5 5 
4) Z) —» 6 C - ^ 7  
5) C - » 5  Z) —» 8 
6) C - ^ 6  C - » 9  
7) D -» 10 11 
8) D 7 D - »  1 2  
9) C —*• 1 D - + 2  
10) C - ^ 9  C - ^  1 2  
H) D - ^ 2  10 





































States: 14. Start:D —* 0 
IfC If D 
0) 
1) 
c —» 0 
C —» 2 
C - »  1  
D ^ 3 
2) C - »  1  C - + 4  
3) C - + 5  D —» 6 
4) D - + 7  C - + 8  
5) (7 —» 2 C - ^ 2  
6) C - +  9  D-+ 10 
7) C - » 7  11 
8) C - 4  1 2  7 
9) D —• 0 12 
10) C - ^ 5  C - » 5  
11) (7 —^ 1 D - » 2  
12) C - + 9  ^ ^ 13 



































States: 11. Start:D —> 0 
I f C  HD 
0) c - » o  1 
1) C —^ 2 Z) —» 0 
2) C - » l  C - ^ 3  
3) ^ 4 C - ^ 5  
4) C - ^ 4  C —> 6 
5) 7 D - > 8  
6) 1 D -» 9 
7) ( 7 - ^ 8  10 
8) D —• 0 C - +  7  
9) D -+ 10 C - +  7  



































States: 13. Start: D —» 0 
I f C  If D 
0) C —^ 0 (7 —^ 1 
1) C - + 2  D - + 0  
2) C - »  1  C - ^ 3  
3) D - » 4  C - ^ 5  
4) C - * 4  C —> 6 
5) D - > 7  
00 î C
t 
6) C - ^ l  D  - ^ 9  
7) C - » 6  10 
8) D - ^ 4  C - » 7  
9) D 10 7 
10) 11 D - t 5  
11) C - ^ 8  12 
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